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Welfare reform promised welfare mothers that if they went to work, they would receive 
the work supports and assistance necessary to help them find and keep employment. Congress 
has fulfilled some of that promise in that expenditures on child care subsidies and Medicaid for 
working families have increased since the early 1990s. However, work supports are generally 
time-limited and phase-out quickly as income rises. This limits their ability to stay employed 
because most mothers do not easily transition off government work supports into private-sector 
work supports. 
 
This study examines the importance of two work supports—health insurance and child 
care—in promoting employment and wage growth for prime-age mothers. Mothers on welfare 
and other low-income mothers are often eligible for Medicaid and child care subsidies but as 
they move up the job ladder, they lose eligibility. Employer-provided health insurance is an 
option for those lucky enough to have found a job that provides it. However, there is no private 
sector equivalent to child care subsidies and a mother must be able to afford market prices for 
child care once her subsidy runs out. 
 
Work supports matter and losing them limits mother’s ability to stay employed. This is 
more the case for health insurance than for child care. However, this is most likely due to the fact 
that a relatively small number of children have access to child care subsidies, and therefore it is 
difficult to measure their impact.  
 
Few mothers make the transition from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance. 
Between the beginning of 1997 and the end of 1998, 41.5 percent of those on Medicaid left the 
program but less than one third of those (27.7 percent) moved into employer-provided health 
insurance. Between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003, 37.2 percent of those on 
Medicaid left the program, but fewer than a quarter (23.4 percent) of those had employer-
provided health insurance. This falloff in the early 2000s in the share moving directly into 
employer-provided health insurance is most likely attributable to the protracted labor market 
recession and falling employer-provided health insurance coverage overall. 
 
The problem is not necessarily that Medicaid leavers lacked employment, but that they 
did not find jobs that offered employer-provided health insurance. Among those who left 
Medicaid in the late 1990s, the share moving from a job without employer-provided health 
insurance to one with insurance was just under one third (28.7 percent), however this fell by 14.0 
percentage points, down to 14.7 percent by the early 2000s. There was not, however, a 
comparably large decline in the share of mothers overall who moved from a job without 
employer-provided health insurance to one with. In the late 1990s, one-in-five (18.3 percent) of 
all mothers made this transition and in the early 2000s, this share only fell by 1.6 percentage 
points to 16.7 percent.  
 
The transition from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance is critical. Mothers 
who make this transition into employer-provided health insurance are nine times more likely to 
stay employed than mothers who leave Medicaid without this benefit. In fact, mothers leaving 
Medicaid with employer-provided health insurance are just as likely to stay employed as mothers 
  2who have employer-provided health insurance and are not Medicaid leavers. All Medicaid 
leavers suffer a wage penalty—that is, their wages are lower than those of comparable women, 
all else equal—, however, compared to other mothers. This is true regardless of whether they left 
Medicaid with or without employer-provided health insurance. 
 
Child care subsidies are less common than Medicaid. Welfare mothers are not more 
likely than mothers who have left welfare to receive child care subsidies. However, since so 
few—about one-in-eight—eligible children receives a subsidy, the negligible effect on 
employment may be due to the limited numbers receiving help.  
 
Mothers who receive child care subsidies, however, are likely to be able to continue 
receiving them. Most—over 90 percent—mothers who had subsidies in 1997 still had a subsidy 
two years later in 1999. Child care subsidies have a positive effect on employment, but losing 
them does not necessarily lead to losing employment. As with Medicaid, mothers who have child 
care subsidies suffer a wage penalty, compared to other mothers. 
 
What we know is that work supports matter. The private market does not step up quickly 
enough to allow the majority of women leaving Medicaid the opportunity to participate in an 
employer-based health insurance plan. The promise of work supports is only fulfilled, however, 
if they help mothers both find and maintain employment. Rapid phase-outs and relatively low 
earnings thresholds limit mothers’ ability to stay employed, even if they had been successful at 
finding employment. 
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  4Introduction 
Over the 1990s, the purpose of welfare changed from being a program that paid mothers 
to stay at home to being one that ostensibly offered support to mothers to enable them to hold 
down a job. The foundation of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act—commonly known as welfare reform—was that families should move from 
welfare into self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. This landmark legislation created time limits 
and mandated work requirements for those receiving cash assistance. In exchange, policymakers 
said that they would facilitate the movement towards self-sufficiency by increasing access to 
work supports for workers.  
 
The passage of welfare reform accelerated a shift that began in the early 1990s. States 
have begun been spending an increasing portion of their public assistance dollars on work 
supports, in particular Medicaid, other state public health programs, child care, and 
transportation, while the share going to cash assistance has decreased. Funding was available for 
these supports because Congress pegged the amount of money that states received under welfare 
reform to caseload levels in the early 1990s. When caseloads plummeted in the late 1990s, the 
states had more welfare money per client to spend. Further, within a year of the passage of 
welfare reform, the federal government increased other forms of assistance to low-wage workers 
by increasing the minimum wage, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, and initiating the 
State Child Health Insurance Program, which extended Medicaid to the children of low-wage 
workers. 
 
However, many of these work supports are time-limited or phase-out quickly as income 
rises. For example, although most women moving off welfare will find jobs without health 
insurance, federal law requires states to offer just six months of Medicaid coverage to families 
leaving welfare for work. Some states have waivers for the first full year or year and a half of 
employment, but this is rare. Similarly with child care: in 1999, 20 states had imposed time 
limits on the receipt of child care subsidies ranging from two months to three years, with an 
average of 16 months. As states moved through the fiscal crises of the early 2000s, many of 
these work support programs were either reduced or eliminated. When that happened, those 
working were often the first to be cut from the programs. 
 
Only women who are on welfare or working and receiving poverty or near-poverty wages 
are eligible for health insurance and child care work supports. This creates a hole in the safety 
net for low-wage, working women, who are not likely to have access to employer-provided 
health insurance. Further, the phase-out of work supports reduces women’s ability to become and 
remain self sufficient by limiting their ability to stay employed and, thus, move up the job ladder. 
 
Very few mothers on Medicaid make the transition to employer-provided health 
insurance. Between the beginning of 1997 and the end of 1998, 41.5 percent of those on 
Medicaid left the program, but nearly one third of those (27.7 percent) moved from Medicaid 
into employer-provided health insurance. Between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003, 
37.2 percent of those on Medicaid left the program, but fewer than a quarter (23.4 percent) of 
those had employer-provided health insurance. This falloff in the share moving directly into 
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recession and falling employer-provided health insurance coverage overall. 
 
The problem was not necessarily that Medicaid leavers lacked employment, but that they 
did not find jobs that offered employer-provided health insurance. Among those who left 
Medicaid in the late 1990s, the share moving from a job without employer-provided health 
insurance to one with was just under one third (28.7 percent), however this fell by 14.0 
percentage points, down to 14.7 percent in the early 2000s. There was not, however, a large 
decline in the share of mothers overall who moved from a job with employer-provided health 
insurance to one without. In the late 1990s, one-in-five (18.3 percent) of all mothers made this 
transition and in the early 2000s, this share only fell by 1.6 percentage points, down to 16.7 
percent.  
 
The transition from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance is critical because 
mothers who make this transition nine times more likely to stay employed than mothers who 
leave Medicaid without employer-provided health insurance. Mothers leaving Medicaid with 
employer-provided health insurance are just as likely to stay employed as mothers who have 
employer-provided health insurance and are not Medicaid leavers. All Medicaid leavers suffer a 
wage penalty, however, compared to other mothers. This is true regardless of whether they left 
Medicaid with or without employer-provided health insurance. 
 
Child care subsidies are far rarer than Medicaid. Welfare mothers are not more likely 
than mothers who have left welfare to receive child care subsidies. However, since so few—
about one-in-eight—eligible children receives a subsidy, the limited effect may be due to the 
limited numbers receiving help.  
 
Mothers who receive child care subsidies, however, are likely to be able to continue 
receiving them. Most—over 90 percent—mothers who had subsidies in 1997 still had a subsidy 
two years later in 1999. 
 
Child care subsidies have a positive effect on employment, but losing them does not 
necessarily lead to losing employment. As with Medicaid, mothers who have child care subsidies 
suffer a wage penalty, compared to other mothers.  
 
The problem is the two-tiered nature of social policy. While the social safety net provides 
work supports to the very poor and employers provide them for the upper and middle classes, 
neither provides for the working poor.  In short, the way our social policy system works, low-
wage workers are too rich for public supports, but too poor to afford these goods and services on 
their wages. The lack of an adequate safety for low-wage, working parents threatens their ability 
to stay employed and move up the job ladder. It also threatens their ability to parent effectively. 
Mothers who cannot afford safe and enriching child care put their child at risk of falling behind 
in school. Recent research has shown that the positive effects of high quality pre-school are still 
seen decades after the child has grown (Oden, Schweinhart, and Weikart 2004).  
 
In order to create an adequate safety net for all working families, policymakers must 
move away from policies aimed only at the non-working poor or recent labor market entrants 
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would remove the link between having a good job and having access to health care. Further, it is 
likely that a universal system could not only save money in administrative costs, but also provide 
real incentives to keep people healthy, rather than waiting until people are very ill.  
 
Working families also need access to safe, affordable, and enriching child care. In the 
United States, families are more likely to receive assistance with their child’s college costs than 
daycare costs. The Children’s Defense Fund has found that in 14 states, the average annual cost 
of child care is more than double the tuition at a state university (Ewen and Hart 2003). High 
costs come at a time when families can least afford it—when the parents are young, starting out 
in their careers, and when they are also saving up for major life purchases (a home) and paying 
off student debt. A universal pre-kindergarten system would help working families while 
providing the kind of quality environment provided by the public school system. 
 
Work Supports Phase-Out Before Families are Self-Sufficient 
The landmark 1996 welfare reform legislation focused on moving families from welfare 
into self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. The legislation implemented a number of “sticks” 
and “carrots” in order to achieve this goal. Most notably, some of the sticks that Congress 
imposed include a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of cash assistance, a requirement that 50 
percent of welfare recipients had to participate in work by 2002, and a reduction in the ability of 
welfare recipients to be in school while on welfare. Further, Congress changed the program from 
an entitlement, where everyone who was eligible was guaranteed assistance, to a block grant, 
which gives more discretion to the states to cap eligibility and determine how to best spend 
public assistance funds. 
 
Congress did, however, also provide new incentives to keep low-wage workers in the 
labor market by increasing the benefits of work. In 1996, Congress raised the minimum wage 
and increased the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The 1996 welfare reform 
legislation consolidated child care assistance and increased funding for child care under the 
Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF)
2 and, in 1997, Congress expanded low-income 
children’s access to health insurance through Medicaid by implementing the State Child Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP). The end result was that due to the expansion of funding for 
Medicaid, SCHIP, CCDF, the EITC, and the Child Tax Credit, low-income families received 
nine times more assistance in 1999 than in 1984, as federal spending rose from $5.6 to $51.7 
billion (in constant 1999 dollars) (Congressional Budget Office 1998; Sawhill and Haskins 
2002).  
 
These expansions were important because research on basic budgets shows that families 
living above the poverty threshold need access to work supports to make ends meet. The basic 
family budget threshold—the income at which a family will not need any public assistance to 
                                                 
2 CCDF is the administrative term for combined child care funds, including entitlement funds issued under the 
Social Security Act and discretionary funds through the Child Care Development Block Grant. For all practical 
purposes, the funds are administered as one program, CCDF, although there are two funding streams, one an 
entitlement and one discretionary. 
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Mississippi, to a high of $52,114 in Nassau-Suffolk County, New York (in constant 2000 
dollars) (Boushey et al. 2001). Thus, families need income of about twice the poverty line in 
order to afford basic goods and services—including health insurance and safe, enriching, and 
affordable child care. 
 
However, even if families have access to all the benefits for which they are eligible, 
many do not reach their family budget threshold. Figure 1 shows “total resources”—income from 
earnings, as well as cash and in-kind assistance—before and after expenses for a single-parent 
family in Illinois in 2003. Resources for this family includes child care subsidies (through 
CCDF), Food Stamps, Medicaid and/or other public health insurance, Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance, and the federal Child Tax Credit Refund and EITC 
while they are eligible for them. This family “breaks even”—that is, it has income greater than 
expenses—at a fairly low earnings level, about $5,000 per year.
3 Illinois has relatively generous 
policies; a similar family in Pennsylvania, for example, would not break even until they hit 
$30,000 per year. However, between earnings of $5,000 and about $40,000, the Illinois family 
sees little or no real improvement in their resources, once we account for expenditures on basic 
needs. 
 
                                                 
3 This model assumes that the family does not have access to employer-provided health insurance and, if they do not 
have public health insurance, they must pay for private health insurance out-of-pocket. The model also assumes that 
the family receives all benefits that they are eligible for, which is a highly unreasonable assumption as most families 
receive only one or two benefits that they are eligible for, not the entire basket of goods and services (National 
Center for Children in Poverty 2004). 
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Source: National Center for Children in Poverty (2004).  
Note: “Resources” includes income from earnings, as well as cash and in-kind assistance, such as child care 
subsidies or Medicaid 
 
A major problem with the current structure of work supports is that they have relatively 
rapid phase-outs. As a result, for many low-income families, higher earnings are largely or 
completely offset by a reduction in benefits. Although the rules vary across states, most work 
supports phase-out when a family reaches somewhere around the poverty threshold. In addition, 
program rules prohibit families from receiving work supports for a long period of time once they 
are employed, even if they have very low earnings. Thus, while work supports are intended to 
support both current and former working welfare recipients, they most often benefit only current 
welfare recipients and are not as useful for working families. This has become increasingly the 
case since the early 2000s, when many states faced large budget deficits and assistance for 
working families was often one of the first items to be cut back. 
 
 
Access to Work Supports 
 
The three most expensive family budget items are housing, health insurance, and child 
care. Only health insurance and child care can be evaluated as a work support, however, because 
access to subsidized housing is not generally tied directly to employment. Further, shortages in 
housing vouchers and public housing availability limit the potential for many families to access 
housing subsidies as only about one out of every four families eligible for a housing voucher 
actually receives one (Sard and Fischer 2004). Health insurance and child care subsidies, 
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it through an employer, either their own or a spouse’s, and Medicaid picks up the coverage for 
the non-working poor and many children of the working poor. Child care subsidies are generally 
offered through the government to employed parents or, occasionally, by employers (usually 
only to high-end workers, however, not low-wage workers). The remainder of this analysis 
focuses on access to health insurance and child care because they are the two most expensive 
family budget items tied to employment and because these work supports are a critical 
component in making the transition from welfare to work sustainable. 
 
This analysis only examines access to works supports for mothers, rather than entire 
families. Access to employer-provided health insurance is only measured when it is in the 
mother’s own name, from her employer, rather than from a spouse or other family member’s 
employer. This is because the analysis examines the effects of policy on moving mothers off 
welfare and into the labor market. Although one stated goal of welfare reform was to encourage 
marriage, we do not evaluate this policy goal in this report. 
 
This analysis examines which mothers have access to work supports, in particular health 
insurance and child care. The result presented are simulations for low-wage mothers, earning 
$10.00 an hour or less in constant 1999 dollars. The regressions, however, include all mothers. 
The results of the simulations are similar for low-wage and all mothers. (See Appendix B for a 
full description of the estimation techniques.) 
 
Medicaid: Transitional Assistance Phases Out Before Many Get Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance  
 
Medicaid was established in 1967 by the federal government to provide public health 
insurance to the nation’s poor. Currently, one-in-seven children (14.0 percent in 2002) and 5.8 
percent of adults under age 65 are covered by Medicaid or the State Child Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP) (Boushey and Wright 2004b). However, low income limits for eligibility for 
the program cause many working families to be excluded from the program, even though they 
still may not be able to obtain health services through employer- or self-provided insurance. This 
is particularly problematic because welfare reform pushed families receiving welfare into the 
workforce. If work means the loss of basic access to health care, this creates a substantial 
disincentive for mothers to choose employment over welfare receipt. 
 
Before the 1996 welfare reform, families usually had to receive cash assistance from 
welfare—what was then called Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—in 
order to be eligible for Medicaid. This requirement effectively excluded almost all working 
families from the program, just as working families were excluded from welfare. In families 
above poverty, only children under age six and pregnant women living below 133% of the 
poverty line were eligible for Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2004b). 
 
  Welfare reform, which gave states a great deal of flexibility in establishing Medicaid 
eligibility standards, also opened up new opportunities to expand Medicaid coverage to working 
families. Currently, federal law requires states to provide only six months of medical coverage to 
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whose income remains below 185 percent of the federal poverty line receive an additional six 
months, for a total of one year. Over the years, 11 states have obtained waivers to extend 
Transitional Medical Assistance however, by 2002, all but three had expired and not been 
renewed (Mann 2002). 
 
The other major innovation in health care policy for low-income families over the 1990s 
was the 1997 expansion of Medicaid through SCHIP. The goal of SCHIP was to “to provide 
funds to States to enable them to initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to 
uninsured, low-income children in an effective and efficient manner that is coordinated with 
other sources of health benefits coverage for children.” This program provides health coverage 
for children of the working poor – children of families with incomes in most instances between 
100 and 200 percent of the federal poverty level.
4 SCHIP, however, only expanded coverage for 
children; their parents remain ineligible. Under SCHIP, states can either expand their Medicaid 
program to cover more children, they can establish a separate program, or they can do both. 
Funding for Medicaid and SCHIP increased by $92.4 billion from 1997 to 2002, from $160.7 to 
$253.1 billion (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2004a, p. 3).
5 
 
States varied, however, in how they used their new flexibility to cover working families 
under Medicaid and SCHIP. All states expanded coverage for children after the 1996 law, due in 
large part to high federal matching rates for extra state investment in childhood coverage under 
SCHIP. As of April 2003, only 12 states failed to cover kids in families earning up to twice the 
federal poverty line (Kaiser Family Foundation various years). However, coverage of parents in 
working families was not comparably expanded under the new “family coverage” category. In 
2001, most states (31 out of 51) did not extend coverage to parents with incomes above the 
poverty line. 
 
After the recession of the early 2000s, which began in March 2001, income limits as a 
share of the poverty threshold were lowered for working parents. Table 1 shows the generosity of 
state Medicaid policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s, pre- and post-recession. Pre-recession, 
working parents in families with income above the poverty line were eligible for Medicaid in 20 
states, however post-recession, this was true in only 16 states. Only four states had a cutoff as 
high as double the poverty threshold before the recession. This number fell to three states after 
the recession. In 2003, 13 states made additional cuts to their Medicaid program. SCHIP 
coverage for children has also fallen victim to constricting state budgets, as six states have 
completely frozen SCHIP enrollment and others have cut back (Ross and Cox 2004). 
 
                                                 
4 This eligibility level is determined on a state-by-state basis. For a summary of the rates in each state, see Kaiser 
Family Foundation (various years). 
5 However, many states were slow to begin making use of the new federal funds (Kenney, Ullman, and Weil 2000). 
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(Income as a percent of the federal poverty threshold) 
                   
  Working parents   Children    Working parents   Children 
State  2001  2003    2001  2003   State  2001  2003    2001  2003 
Alabama  21%  20%  133%  200% Montana  69%  67%  133%  17% 
Alaska  79  81  200  200 Nebraska  55  57  185  0 
Arizona  107  200  133  200 Nevada  90  88  133  67 
Arkansas  21  20  200  200 New  Hampshire  62  61  185  115 
California  107  107  133  250 New  Jersey  200  42  133  217 
Colorado  42  47  133  185 New  Mexico  58  71  235  0 
Connecticut  157  107  185  300  New  York  133  150  133  117 
Delaware  122  120  133  200 North  Carolina  62  59  133  67 
District of 
Columbia  200  200  200  200 North  Dakota  110  94  133  7 
Florida  66  63  133  200 Ohio  100  100  200  0 
Georgia  62  59  133  235 Oklahoma  48  46  185  0 
Hawaii  100  100  200  200  Oregon  100  100  133  52 
Idaho  33  32  150  150 Pennsylvania  56  66  133  67 
Illinois  56  83  133  185 Rhode  Island  192  192  250  0 
Indiana  31  30  150  200 South  Carolina  100  98  150  0 
Iowa  87  84  133  200 South  Dakota  65  63  200  0 
Kansas 40  39    133  200  Tennessee  81  100    N/A  N/A 
Kentucky  75  71  150  200 Texas  32  34  133  67 
Louisiana  22  21  200  200 Utah  55  53  133  67 
Maine  157  157  150  200  Vermont  192  192  300  0 
Maryland  43  41  200  300 Virginia  31  37  133  67 
Massachusetts  133  133  150  200 Washington  200  86  200  50 
Michigan  63  61  150  200 West  Virginia  28  39  150  50 
Minnesota  275  275  275  275  Wisconsin  185  185  185  0 
Mississippi  38  36  133  200 Wyoming  65  62  133  0 
Missouri 107  84    300  300             
                   
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation (various years).  
Note: In 2000, in Tennessee, children’s eligibility for Medicaid was determined by lack of insurance, rather than 
an income limit. 
 
 
Table 2 shows how these policies have shaped who receives Medicaid. Because the 
Medicaid eligibility rules favor those on welfare and recent welfare leavers, prime-age, low-
wage, working mothers are much more likely to receive Medicaid if they are on welfare, relative 
to those not on welfare and those who recently left welfare (Table 2).
6 In the late 1990s, low-
wage, working mothers on welfare were 53.2 percent more likely than mothers who had left 
welfare within the past six months to be on Medicaid. Medicaid eligibility rules do not favor all 
former welfare recipients, however, only those who have recently left the program. Low-wage, 
working mothers who left welfare over two years ago were 13.3 percent less likely than more 
recent welfare leavers to receive Medicaid.  
                                                 
6 See Appendix for a complete description of the data and analysis. 
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Table 2. Probability Low-Wage Working Mothers Receive Medicaid 
    
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Relative to those exiting welfare within past six months:   
Welfare recipient  53.2%***  44.5%*** 
Months since welfare exit   
7 to 12 months  -7.2***  -9.2*** 
13 to 18 months  -12.0***  -8.7*** 
19 to 24 months  -13.2***  -9.5*** 
25 months or more  -13.3***  -10.1* 
    
Relative to those working continuously six months or less:   
Continuous months of employment     
7 to 12 months  -3.6***  -3.3*** 
13 to 18 months  -4.7***  -7.0*** 
19 to 24 months  -4.7***  -7.1*** 
25 months or more  -5.2***  -6.2*** 
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning 
at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects 
are calculated from a logit estimation of the probability of receiving Medicaid. For 
full model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming 
that months off welfare and months employed are equal and all other values are set 
at their means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
By the early 2000s, however, low-wage working mothers on welfare were less likely to 
receive Medicaid than they had been in the late 1990s, compared to those who had exited welfare 
in the past six months. There was an 8.7 percentage point decline in their probability of receiving 
Medicaid, down to 44.5 percent. Compared to the late 1990s, the probability of receiving 
Medicaid more than a year after leaving welfare also fell. Over this time period, the share of 
families on Medicaid increased slightly overall for adults, and increased by about a third for 
children (Boushey and Wright 2004b). Thus, although Medicaid coverage rose slightly, the 
composition of those on Medicaid shifted away from current recipients towards welfare leavers. 
 
Mother’s months of continuous employment did not change the likelihood of receiving 
Medicaid as much as length of time off welfare. Low-wage, working mothers who had been at 
work for more than two years were 5.4 percent less likely to receive Medicaid, compared to 
those only at work for less than six months. Those at work for only a year were 7.1 percent less 
likely to have Medicaid, relative to those only employed less than six months. The share of low-
wage mothers on Medicaid did not shift over this time period. 
 
Overall, Medicaid remains a program for mothers on welfare, rather than low-wage, 
working mothers who have left welfare. The short phase-out of Transitional Medical Assistance 
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led states to favor recent welfare leavers over other categories of mothers so that by the early 
2000s, the probability of receiving Medicaid was greater for those having left welfare within the 
past six months than it was in the late 1990s. 
 
Few Mothers Make the Transition from Medicaid to Employer-Provided Health Insurance  
 
The underlying logic behind providing Medicaid as a work support is that this should 
help recent welfare leavers access health insurance until they either receive employer-provided 
health insurance or can afford to purchase private health insurance. However, many of those who 
left welfare during the late 1990s and early 2000s moved into low-wage, short-tenure jobs that 
did not offer employer-provided health insurance. In the late 1990s, the average wage in these 
jobs was between $6.00 to $8.00 per hour and only about one-quarter received health benefits 
(Loprest 2001). Thus, not only were few able to access health insurance through their employer, 
but wages were generally so low that they could not reasonably afford private health insurance 
on their own. 
 
The low rate of transitions from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance 
exemplifies the limited ability of former welfare recipients to find high quality jobs. Among 
those leaving Medicaid, over the two-year period from the beginning of 1997 through the end of 
1998, just over one-in-ten (11.8 percent) moved from Medicaid into employer-provided health 
insurance (EPHI) (Table 3). There was a 2.0 percentage point drop in the share making this 
transition between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003. In reality, most mothers remained 
on Medicaid, with 58.4 percent staying over 1997 through 1998 and 62.8 percent staying from 
2002 through 2003, but a not-insignificant share—about one-third in both time periods—moved 
off Medicaid without having employer-provided health insurance. 
 
  Therefore, among the 41.5 percent leaving Medicaid between the beginning of 1997 and 
the end of 1998, nearly one third of those (27.7 percent) moved from Medicaid into employer-
provided health insurance. However, fewer left Medicaid for employer-provided health insurance 
in the early 2000s: of the 37.2 percent of those who left Medicaid between the beginning of 2002 
and the end of 2003, fewer than a quarter (23.4 percent) had employer-provided health insurance. 
This 4.3 percentage point decline in the share of those who left Medicaid and moved to 
employer-provided health insurance is likely due to the fact that in the recession of the early 
2000s, the rate of employer-provided coverage fell overall. 
 
African Americans and whites were more likely than Hispanics to move from Medicaid 
into employer-provided health insurance. Over the two-year period from 1997 through 1998, 
12.9 percent of both African Americans and whites moved from Medicaid to employer-provided 
health insurance, while only 7.8 percent of Hispanics made this transition. The low transition rate 
from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance for Hispanics is consistent with the low 
rates of employer-provided health insurance coverage for Hispanics overall (Boushey and 
Wright 2004a). 
 
  14Although whites were just as likely as African Americans to transition from Medicaid to 
employer-provided health insurance, whites were more likely than African Americans to leave 
Medicaid without having employer-provided health insurance and less likely to stay on 
Medicaid. In the late 1990s, 34.2 percent of whites transitioned off Medicaid without employer-
provided health insurance, compared to only 22.8 percent of African Americans. Only 52.9 
percent of whites remained on Medicaid in the late 1990s, compared to 64.3 percent of African 
Americans, an 11.4 percentage point gap. However, this gap shrunk to only 2.7 percentage points 
in the early 2000s, as 62.5 percent of whites and 65.2 percent of African Americans remained on 
Medicaid. Non-citizens were more likely than other groups to leave Medicaid without having 
employer-provided health insurance and also less likely to stay on Medicaid, compared to native-




Table 3. Transitions from Medicaid into Employer-Provided Health Insurance (EPHI) 
            
 
Among those on Medicaid in 
January 1997, health insurance 
status in December 1998 
Among those on Medicaid in 
January 2002, health insurance 
status in December 2003 
   Medicaid  EPHI   Neither    Medicaid  EPHI   Neither 
All 58.5%  11.5%  30.0%  62.8%  8.7%  28.5% 
            
White 52.9  12.9  34.2  62.5  9.2  28.3 
African American  64.3  12.9  22.8  65.2  12.3  22.6 
Hispanic 58.1  7.8  34.1  57.1  6.1  36.8 
Other 73.2  8.9  17.9  77.8  2.2  20.0 
            
Native 59.0  12.0  29.0  64.5  9.7  25.8 
Naturalized 76.0  12.0  12.0  58.3  8.3  33.3 
Non-citizen 54.6  8.6  36.8  57.0  3.2  39.8 
            
Children infants to age 5 
only  47.3 17.6  35.2  61.4 5.3  33.3 
Children 6 to 17 only  60.1  11.9  28.0  64.2  8.7  27.1 
Children infants to age 5 & 
children 6 to 17  56.9 10.5  32.5  57.8 11.2  31.1 
            
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Transitions are measured from the first to the last month 
of the period and will not include transitions that occur within the two-year period. Thus, a person 
moving from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance then back to Medicaid within the period 
will be counted as staying on Medicaid.  
Mothers with young children were less likely to stay on Medicaid and more likely to 
leave Medicaid without having employer-provided health insurance, compared to mothers who 
only had children from age six to 17. In the early 2000s, mothers with only pre-school age 
children were very unlikely to move to employer-provided health insurance, with only 5.3 
  15percent moving from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance, while one-third (33.3 
percent) moved off Medicaid without having employer-provided health insurance. 
 
Longer Employment Tenure Increases Probability of Having Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance 
 
Mothers do not quickly transition from Medicaid into employer-provided health 
insurance. However, the longer a mother is off welfare and on the job, the greater her probability 
of acquiring employer-provided health insurance, at least in the late 1990s (Table 4). Compared 
to mothers who left welfare within the past six months, the probability of having employer-
provided health insurance in the late 1990s is 16.5 percentage points greater for those who left 
welfare over two years earlier and 14.3 percent greater for those that had been working for more 
than two years. This is nearly three times as large a probability than for those who left welfare 
and had been employed for the past seven to 12 months. 
 
However, length of time since leaving welfare was not a factor in predicting whether a 
low-wage working mother had access to employer-provided health insurance in the early 2000s. 
Compared to the late 1990s, the effect of employment tenure on the likelihood of receiving 
employer-provided health insurance was also smaller in the early 2000s.  
 
The differences across the late 1990s and early 2000s may be due to changes in the how 
firms offer health insurance. For the past three years, there have been double-digit increases in 
health insurance costs, far higher than overall inflation (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured 2003). Employers are increasingly passing these higher costs on to their employees in 
the form of higher premiums or co-payments (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2003). In the early 
2000s, it may have been more difficult for former welfare recipients to find jobs with health 
insurance or to afford the higher premiums many employers were requiring employees to pay, 
compared to the late 1990s.  
 
  16Table 4. Probability of Receiving Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Among Low-wage Working Mothers 
    
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Relative to those exiting welfare within past six months:   
Welfare recipient  -2.3  5.0 
Months since welfare exit:     
7 to 12 months  5.0***  -2.7 
13 to 18 months  10.4***  -1.3 
19 to 24 months  15.5***  2.8 
25 months or more  16.5***  3.2 
    
Relative to those working continuously six months or less: 
Continuous months of employment:     
7 to 12 months  5.2***  3.9*** 
13 to 18 months  8.5***  6.5*** 
19 to 24 months  11.3***  8.6*** 
25 months or more  14.3***  10.3*** 
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54 Low-wage workers are those 
earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 1999 constant dollars. 
Marginal effects are calculated from a logit estimation of the probability of 
receiving employer-provided health insurance. For full model results, see 
Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming that months off 
welfare and months employed are equal and all other values are set at their 
means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Transitioning from Medicaid into a job with employer-provided health insurance became 
less likely between the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Table 5). Among those who left Medicaid 
in the late 1990s, the share moving from a job without employer-provided health insurance to 
one with employer-provided health insurance was 28.7 percent, 14.0 percentage points higher 
than in the early 2000s when only 14.7 made this transition. The strong labor market of the late 
1990s may be part of the reason. At that time, individuals could job-switch to find better wages 
or benefits and the labor market was especially good for low-wage workers, who saw their first 
significant inflation-adjusted wage gains in decades. However, in the early 2000s, the recession 
made finding a good job more difficult. The low rate of transition into employer-provided health 
insurance may also be due to the rapid increases in health insurance costs during the past few 
years and the greater likelihood of employers asking workers to pay a larger share of the 
premiums. 
 
It may also be that those who left Medicaid in the late 1990s were more advantaged than 
those in the early 2000s, given the large decreases in the welfare rolls over the past decade. As 
the better skilled mothers have moved off welfare, those left on welfare are more disadvantaged 
  17and less equipped to find the kinds of jobs that offered employer-provided health insurance 
(Boushey and Wenger 2003). 
 
While the probability of transitioning from a job without employer provided health 
insurance to a job with insurance fell sharply for Medicaid leavers between the late nineties and 
the early 2000s, it did not change for other mothers. During the late 1990s, among those who 
started with a job, but did not have employer-provided health insurance, one-in-five (18.3 
percent) had a job with employer-provided health insurance two years later. During the early 
2000s, the share gaining employer-provided health insurance fell by 1.6 percentage points, down 
to 16.7 percent.  
 
Over this time period, because of the recession, mothers—both all mothers and Medicaid 
leavers—became more likely to stay without a job and less likely to move from no job into a job 
with or without employer-provided health insurance. However, mothers leaving Medicaid saw a 
15.2 percentage point increase in their likelihood of staying unemployed, from 64.1 percent in 
the late 1990s up to 79.3 percent in the early 2000s, while mothers overall only saw a 6.1 
percentage point increase over the same time period, from 70.0 to 76.1 percent. 
 
Table 5. Transitions into Jobs with Employer-Provided Health Insurance (EPHI) 
            
  Status at end of period 
  January 1997 to December 1998  January 2002 to December 2003 
Status at beginning of period 
No job, no 
EPHI 
Job, no 
EPHI  Job, EPHI
No job, no 
EPHI 
Job, no 
EPHI  Job, EPHI 
No job, no EPHI  70.0%  23.4%  6.6%  76.1%  18.3%  5.7% 
Job, no EPHI  16.9  64.7  18.3  19.1  64.3  16.7 
Job, EPHI  6.6  14.3  79.1  7.4  14.8  77.8 
            
Medicaid Leavers             
No job, no EPHI  64.1  28.3  7.6  79.3  15.9  4.9 
Job, no EPHI  19.4  51.9  28.7  20.0  65.3  14.7 
Job, EPHI  3.5  13.8  82.8  3.9  13.7  82.4 
            
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Transitions are measured from the first to the last month of 
the period and will not include transitions that occur within the two-year period. Thus, a person moving 
from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance, then back to Medicaid within the period will be 
counted as staying on Medicaid.  
 
The Generosity of a State’s Medicaid Program Plays a Role 
 
The likelihood of leaving Medicaid for employer-provided health insurance is related to 
the generosity of the state’s Medicaid program. Working mothers living in states with generous 
programs are more likely to stay on Medicaid long enough to transition from Medicaid directly 
into employer-provided health insurance, although these transitions are still relatively rare in all 
  18states. To evaluate this, states’ Medicaid programs were rated by examining how states covered a 
working parent with two children. Specifically, the rating is based on how much income parents 
could earn and still be eligible for their state’s Medicaid program in early 2000, before the 
beginning of the recession and subsequent fiscal crises in most states (Broaddus et al. 2002, 
Table 6). 
 
States that cut off Medicaid eligibility under a “family coverage” category for working 
parents with two children at or below one-half of the poverty line were given a “least generous” 
rating. States whose income ceiling for such parents fell above one-half of the poverty line, but 
below the poverty line itself, were given a “moderately generous” rating. States who covered 
such parents all the way up to or above the poverty line were given a “most generous” rating. 
Five states—Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Texas—had not implemented a 
“family coverage” category, required by the welfare reform law, by 2000. For these states, the 
income ceilings for a single working parent with two children were used to measure generosity 
(Broaddus et al. 2002). Twenty states were given a rating of least generous, 24 were given a 
rating of moderately generous, and 7 received the most generous rating.
7  
 
Mothers living in states with the least generous state Medicaid policies were more likely 
to leave Medicaid, compared to those living in moderate and more generous states (Table 6). 
Those in the least generous states were also more often likely to leave Medicaid without having 
employer-provided health insurance. Over the two-year period from January 1997 to December 
1998, 36.0 percent of those living in the least generous states left Medicaid without having 
employer-provided health insurance, while 25.6 percent of those in the most generous and 27.0 
in the moderately generous did so.  
 
However, those in the least generous states were about as likely as those in other states to 
transition from Medicaid into employer-provided health insurance. Over the two-year period in 
the late 1990s, 10.7 percent of those in the most generous, 9.9 percent of those in the moderately 
generous, and 12.3 percent of those in the least generous transitioned from Medicaid into 
employer-provided health insurance. Thus, state generosity plays a role in whether mothers are 
allowed to stay on Medicaid until they are able to transition directly into employer-provided 
health insurance. While all states have relatively high rates of mothers leaving Medicaid without 
employer-provided health insurance, this rate is much higher in the least generous states.  
 
                                                 
7 The least generous states are AL, AZ, AR, CO, GA, ID, IN, KS, LA, MD, MI, MS, MO, NE, OK, PA, TX, VA, 
WV, WI; the moderately generous states are AK, CT, DE, FL, HI, IL, IA, KY, MN, MT, NV, NH, NM, NY, NC, 
ND, OR, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, WA, WY; and the most generous states are CA, DC, ME, MA, NJ, OH, RI, 
  19Table 6. Transitions from Medicaid by Generosity of State Medicaid Program    
            
 
Among those on Medicaid in January 
1997, health insurance status in 
December 1998   
Among those on Medicaid in January 
2002, health insurance status in 
December 2003 
   Medicaid  EPHI  Neither    Medicaid  EPHI   Neither 
Most Generous  63.7%  10.7%  25.6%  67.4% 7.1%  25.5% 
Moderately Generous  63.0  9.9  27.0  58.4 9.8  31.8 
Least Generous  51.7  12.3  36.0  62.9 9.1  28.1 
            
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Transitions are measured from the first to the last month of 
the period and will not include transitions that occur within the two-year period. Thus, a person moving 
from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance then back to Medicaid within the period will be 
counted as staying on Medicaid. Generosity of Medicaid programs is based on the income eligibility rules.
 
Child Care Subsidies: Limited Assistance, but Not Concentrated Among Welfare 
Recipients 
 
Child care subsidies are designed to help mothers address their child care needs while 
working. For low-wage mothers, the costs of child care can eat up a large share of their family 
budget. In 2002, mothers at the bottom 40
th percentile or below who paid for formal daycare 
spent an average of 16 percent of their total income on child care, compared to only 6 percent 
among mothers in the highest quintile (Boushey and Wright 2004c). However, few families 
receive child care assistance and there is no private sector equivalent for working mothers to 
transition into once their subsidy runs out. 
 
In the early 1990s, the federal government guaranteed child care assistance for all 
families receiving AFDC cash assistance and participating in education, training, or work. 
However, this assistance was cut off one year after a family began earning too much income to 
be eligible for welfare. Thus, workers leaving welfare quickly lost access to child care support. 
After 1990s, mothers not on welfare had access to two new federally-funded child care 
assistance programs, the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) and the Title IV-A 
At Risk Child Care program, both of which offered assistance to low-income families not on 
welfare (Cohen 2002). Neither program was an entitlement, however, and funding was limited. 
 
With welfare reform in 1996, Congress eliminated all federal guarantees of child care 
assistance and increased state discretion over child care subsidies. Various programs offering 
child care subsidies to families on welfare were replaced with the Child Care Development Fund 
(CCDF). Federal law precludes providing CCDF subsidies to families earning more than 85 
percent of the state median income. This limits the program to those earning less than 125 
percent of the federal poverty threshold in South Carolina while allowing Alaska to cover 
individuals up to 2.5 times the poverty threshold.  
 
  20In the late 1990s, 35 states continued to guarantee child care subsidies for families 
receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) (Parizek, Falk, and Spar 1998). 
Only 27 states extended this guarantee to families transitioning off TANF due to increased 
earnings and of those, in 1999, 20 had imposed time limits on transitional child care assistance 
ranging from two to 36 months and averaging 16 months. Thirteen of those states also imposed 
income limits. The other seven states relied solely on income limits, ranging from 138 to 345 
percent of the poverty threshold for a family of three (Center for Law and Social Policy and the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2000). 
 
Thus, although child care subsidies are an often touted part of welfare reform, they have 
been underfunded and underutilized, relative to need. In the late 1990s, subsidies provided by the 
government did little to help most low-income mothers who needed help paying for child care. 
The Department of Health and Human Services found that only 15 percent of children eligible 
for federal child care assistance received any aid in 1999 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1999). Among low-wage women in the spring of 1997, only 3.7 percent received 
government child care subsidies; in the spring of 2001, 6.0 percent received such subsidies 
(Boushey and Wright 2004c). 
 
Since the economic downturn in 2001, funding for child care subsidies has been reduced 
(Table 7). While income eligibility limits for CCDF funds have not been lowered across the 
board, less money has been available to provide support. As TANF reserves have been drawn 
down since 2000, states have decreased the amount of money in their TANF budgets used to 
fund child care assistance (Mezey 2004). For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, only five states provide 
child care to families up to the allowable 85 percent of state median income and eight states 
impose an income ceiling of less than 50 percent of state median income. 
 
 
  21Table 7. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Income Limits By State, 2001 and 2003 
(Income as a percent of the federal poverty threshold) 
           
State 2001  2003 
Percentage 
point change  State 2001  2003 
Percentage 
point change 
Alabama  130% 127%  -3  Montana  150% 146%  -4 
Alaska  255 259  4  Nebraska  182 168  -14 
Arizona  165 161  -4  Nevada  231 250  19 
Arkansas  133 157  24  New  Hampshire 190 212  22 
California  244 234  -10  New  Jersey  150 243  93 
Colorado  185 219  34  New  Mexico  200 195  -5 
Connecticut  330 317  -13  New  York  202 195  -7 
Delaware  155 195  40  North  Carolina  235 228  -7 
District of 
Columbia  201 277  76  North  Dakota  211 197  -14 
Florida  150 195  45  Ohio  182 180  -2 
Georgia  175 285  110  Oklahoma  167 155  -12 
Hawaii  240 262  22  Oregon  181 180  -1 
Idaho  147 136  -11  Pennsylvania  185 195  10 
Illinois  157 145  -12  Rhode  Island  225 219  -6 
Indiana  143 176  33  South  Carolina  125 146  21 
Iowa  155 151  -4  South  Dakota  150 146  -4 
Kansas  185 180  -5  Tennessee  175 174  -1 
Kentucky  160 161  1  Texas  237 253  16 
Louisiana  209 166  -43  Utah  155 179  24 
Maine  250 243  -7  Vermont  224 207  -17 
Maryland  162 167  5  Virginia  185 180  -5 
Massachusetts  167 193  26  Washington  175 219  44 
Michigan  188 174  -14  West  Virginia  150 188  38 
Minnesota  275 280  5  Wisconsin  165 180  15 
Mississippi  202 201  -1  Wyoming  133 180  47 
Missouri  128  118 -10       
           
Sources: The 1999 data is from Center for Law and Social Policy and the Center on Budget and Policy 




Access to child care subsidies is less affected by welfare receipt or time-limited phase-
outs than is access to Medicaid. Table 8 shows that during the late 1990s, the probability of 
receiving any child care subsidy or a government child care subsidy is slightly less for low-wage 
working mothers with young children who were still on welfare and for those who left welfare 
more than six months ago, than for recent welfare leavers, however the differences are not 
statistically significant. Low-wage working mothers who left welfare more than two years earlier 
are significantly less likely to receive child care subsidies, however. There are no significant 
differences by employment tenure in the probability of receiving child care subsidies, either any 
subsidies or government subsidies. The lack of difference in access to child care subsidies by 
welfare receipt or length of time employed is most likely because child care assistance is 
relatively sparse.  
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Table 8. Probability of Receiving Child Care Subsidies Among Low-Wage Working Mothers with 
Children up to Age Five 
       
  Any child care subsidy  Government subsidy 
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s  Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Relative to those exiting welfare within past six months:       
Welfare recipient  -2.2% 6.5%  -2.1% 3.0% 
Months since welfare exit         
7 to 12 months         -0.9  -3.3  -0.5          -3.2 
13 to 18 months          1.4    -0.8   
19 to 24 months   -5.5**       -8.0*   
25 months or more     -6.6***            -7.6***   
       
Relative to those working continuously six months or less:     
Continuous months of employment          
7 to 12 months  0.3  1.0  0.1  0.8 
13 to 18 months  1.5  0.8  1.0  0.9 
19 to 24 months  0.4    1.7   
25 months or more  0.8    0.7   
       
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54, who had children between infancy and age five. Low-wage 
workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 1999 constant dollars. Marginal 
effects are calculated from a logit estimation of the probability of receiving child care subsidies. For full 
model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming that months off welfare and 
months employed are equal and all other values are set at their means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Unlike Medicaid, once a mother receive child care assistance, however, she is likely to 
continue to receive aid. Table 9 shows that among mothers who had any child care assistance in 
1997, 91.4 percent still received assistance in 1999. Among those who had government child 
care assistance in 1997, 92.5 percent had a government subsidy in 1999. On the other hand, very 
few mothers begin receiving assistance. Only 0.4 percent of mothers started receiving any child 
care assistance in 1999, after having no help in 1997 and 0.2 percent began receiving 
government child care assistance over that same time period.
8 
 
The relatively low rates of child care assistance are due to the limited funding available. 
However, many mothers, including low-income mothers use relative or parental child care 
(Boushey and Wright 2004c). Therefore, they may not need child care subsidies or be able to use 
them for that kind of care. It may also be that mothers refuse vouchers because they require that 
children be placed in child care arrangements that the mother find objectionable. 
                                                 
8 Children may have aged out of child care subsidy eligibility, however. These numbers should be seen as the lower 
bound of the share of mothers acquiring or maintaining child care assistance because the aging out of children would 
bias the findings towards higher rates of not receiving assistance in 1999. 
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Table 9. Transitions In and Out of Child Care Subsidies for Mothers with Children up to 
Age Five 
    
  Any child care subsidy in 1999 
   No  Yes 
Any child care subsidy in 1997       
No 99.6%  0.4% 
Yes 8.7  91.4 
    
  Government child care subsidy in 1999 
   No  Yes 
Government child care subsidy in 1997       
No 99.8%  0.2% 
Yes 7.5  92.5 
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54, who had children between infancy and age five, 
and who reported using any kind of child care. Transitions are measured from the spring of 
1997 to the spring of 1999. Transitions that occur within that period are not measured. 
 
The Effects of Medicaid and Child Care Subsidies on Employment and Earnings  
 
The lack of sustained work supports for working, low-wage women threatens their ability 
to stay employed. Research has indicated that access to work supports increases employment 
tenure, which then feeds back into higher wages (Boushey 2002; Lee 2004; Strawn and 
Martinson 2000). Lee (2004), for example, finds that having employer-provided health insurance 
significantly reduces the rate of leaving jobs. All else equal, mothers with employer-provided 
health insurance are nearly three times as likely to stay on the job compared to mothers with 
other types of health insurance. Research on child care has found that mothers who use formal 
day care or have child care subsidies are more likely to stay employed, relative to mothers 
without access to stable and affordable child care (Anderson and Levine 1999; Wadfogel 1998).  
 
Work supports are, in theory, supposed to help mothers stay employed by providing the 
supports that they need to work. This was the underlying logic of the “Work First” programs 
implemented in many states as a part of welfare reform. The faster the government could get 
women into employment, the sooner they would gain the kinds of on-the-job experience that 
would lead to higher wages.  
 
Work supports not only help mothers stay employed, but also they are correlated with 
wage gains (Newman 2000). Workers with longer work histories generally are paid higher 
wages, and increased work experience is positively correlated with at least moderate wage 
growth (Gladden and Taber 2000). However, for low-wage workers, the gains to tenure have 
been found to be smaller than for higher wage: less educated workers do not experience the 
average within-job wage growth; their real wage profiles within jobs are remarkably flat 
  24(Gottschalk 2000). Even so, workers who end up dropping out of the labor force because they 
cannot solve their child care problem or because they need health insurance and turn back to 
welfare to get Medicaid will not see the same wage gains when they try to go back to work.  
 
However, work supports generally phase-out before private sector supports begin. Most 
mothers transitioning off Medicaid do not move directly into employer-provided health 
insurance, which may make it difficult to remain employed. Child care subsidies, which are 
limited to a small share of eligible mothers, are more likely to be maintained over a two-year 
period, so they may have more of a positive effect on employment and wage outcomes.  
 
This analysis examines the implications of losing Medicaid and child care subsidies for 
employment and wage outcomes for mothers age 25 to 54. The result presented are simulations 
for low-wage mothers, earning $10.00 an hour or less in constant 1999 dollars. The regressions, 
however, include all mothers. The results of the simulations are similar for low-wage and all 
mothers. (See Appendix B for a full description of the estimation techniques.) 
Moving Off Medicaid without Employer-Provided Health Insurance Increases Probability of 
Leaving Employment and Creates Wage Penalty 
 
Low-wage mothers who left Medicaid and had employer-provided health insurance 
(EPHI) were nine times more likely to stay employed, compared to those who left Medicaid 
without having EPHI. Figure 2 shows the probability of staying employed for low-wage mothers 
based on whether they left Medicaid with or without EPHI. Compared to low-wage mothers who 
did not leave Medicaid, but had EPHI, mothers who left Medicaid without EPHI were about one-
third less likely to stay employed over a year, compared to mothers who left Medicaid with 
EPHI.  
 
Mothers who left Medicaid with EPHI had employment durations similar to mothers who 
had EPHI. In the late 1990s, Medicaid leavers were 3.6 percent less likely to stay employed and 
in the early 2000s, they were a statistically insignificant 1.2 percent less likely to stay employed.  
 
  25Figure 2. Annualized probability that low-wage mothers stay 
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Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per hour 
in 1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from a logit estimation of the monthly probability of 
staying employed. For full model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated with all other values 
except those in this figure set at their means. EPHI is employer-provided health insurance. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The level of state Medicaid generosity affected mothers’ probability of staying employed, 
more so in the early 2000s than the late 1990s (Figure 3). In the early 2000s, low-wage mothers 
living in the least generous states who left Medicaid without EPHI were 34.8 percent less likely 
to stay employed relative to low-wage mothers not on Medicaid who had EPHI. However, there 
is an 8.4 percentage point gap between mothers in the least and most generous states as low-
wage mothers who left Medicaid without EPHI in the most generous states were only 26.4 
percent less likely to stay employed.  
 
  26Figure 3. Annualized probability that low-wage mothers stay 
employed by generosity of state Medicaid: 
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Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 
1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from a logit estimation of the monthly probability of staying employed. For 
full model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming that months off welfare and months employed 
are equal and all other values are set at their means. EPHI is employer-provided health insurance. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  Moving from Medicaid to EPHI increases the probability of staying employed, so much 
so that mothers leaving Medicaid look like mothers who have EPHI and are not Medicaid 
leavers. However, mothers leaving Medicaid have lower wages than non-Medicaid mothers with 
EPHI, regardless of whether they left Medicaid with or without EPHI (Figure 4). Mothers 
leaving Medicaid for EPHI have a wage penalty that is half as large as mothers leaving Medicaid 
without EPHI. In the early 2000s, compared to non-Medicaid low-wage mothers with EPHI, the 
wages of low-wage mothers who left Medicaid were 18.9 percent lower for those that did not 
move into EPHI and only 10.5 percent lower for those that did.  
 
The lower wages for all Medicaid leavers may indicate systemic differences in these 
mothers compared to mothers overall. Mothers leaving Medicaid have often also been on welfare 
and there may be a wage penalty associated with the stigma of being a former welfare recipient. 
It may also be that these mothers are willing (and able) to trade off higher wages for health 
insurance. Given two job offers, one with EPHI and one with higher wages, they may choose the 
lower-paying job with health insurance. In general, however, jobs that provide higher wages are 
more likely to provide employer-provided health insurance, however mothers moving off 
Medicaid may be searching for health insurance more so than other low-wage mothers. 
 
  27Figure 4. Effect of losing Medicaid on wages:















Late 1990s Early 2000s






Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. \ 
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 
1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from an estimation of wages using a two-step Heckman procedure. For full 
model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming that months off welfare and months employed are 
equal and all other values are set at their means. EPHI is employer-provided health insurance. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The wage penalty for moving from Medicaid to no EPHI was greatest in states with the 
least generous Medicaid policies (Figure 5). In the late 1990s, low-wage mothers living in the 
least generous stats and had left Medicaid without EPHI had wages that were 21.0 percent lower 
than low-wage mothers who had not been on Medicaid and had EPHI; in the early 2000s, the 
wage penalty was even higher, at 23.8 percent. In both the late 1990s and early 2000s, the wage 
penalty is higher in the least generous states, compared to the most generous states. 
 
  28Figure 5. Effect of losing Medicaid on wages 
by state Medicaid generosity:
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Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 
1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from an estimation of wages using a two-step Heckman procedure. For full 
model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated assuming that months off welfare and months employed are 
equal and all other values are set at their means. EPHI is employer-provided health insurance.  
All estimates significant at 1% 
 
Child Care Subsidies Have Slight Positive Effect on Staying Employed and Little Effect on 
Wages  
 
The effect of child care subsidies on the probability of staying employed is smaller than 
for Medicaid. Having government child care subsidies increased the probability of staying 
employed in the early 2000s by an annualized (statistically significant) 13.2 percent and, in the 
spring of 1997, by a statistically insignificant 7.2 percent annualized increase (Figure 6). 
However, in the spring of 1999, government subsidies led to a decrease in the probability of 
staying employed, although this was statistically insignificant. The limited significance of child 
care subsidies on employment is related to the relatively small numbers of mothers who receive 
assistance.  
 
  29Figure 6. Annualized probability that low-wage mothers stay 













Spring 1997 Spring 1999 Spring 2002
Any child care assistance Government child care assistance
**
**
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54, who had children between infancy and age five. Low-wage workers are those 
earning at or less than $10.00 per hour in December 1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from a logit estimation 
of the monthly probability of staying employed. For full model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated 
assuming that months off welfare and months employed are equal and all other values are set at their means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Losing child care subsidies has a negligible effect on the probability of staying employed 
(Table 10). For mothers who had child care subsidies in the spring of 1997, but not in 1999, the 
probability of staying employed was statistically indistinguishable from mothers who did not 
have subsidies in either period. Those who stayed employed may be less likely to remain eligible 
for child care assistance due to either eligibility rules about the duration of receipt, earnings 
thresholds, or children aging out of subsidies. However, those who gained assistance between the 
spring of 1997 and 1999 saw a statistically significant increase in their probability of staying 
employed in the late 1990s, but not the early 2000s.  
 
For mothers who had assistance in both springs, there was a decrease in their probability 
of staying employed, which was statistically significant it the early 2000s. Mothers who 
continued to need assistance may be disadvantaged in other ways not captured in this model. 
 
  30Table 10. Probability Low-Wage Mothers with Children up to Age Five Stay Employed by Receipt of 
Child Care Subsidies 
 (Annualized)       
    
   Any child care subsidy  Government subsidy 
Lost assistance between Spring 1997 and 1999  8.4%  0.0% 
Had assistance in both Spring 1997 and 1999  -20.4  39.6* 
Gained assistance between Spring 1997 and 1999  9.6*  1.2 
(No assistance in either period omitted)     
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than $10.00 per 
hour in December 1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from a logit estimation of the 
probability of staying employed. For full model results, see Appendix B. The marginal effects are calculated 
with all other values except those in table set at their means. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
  Losing child care subsidies also have little discernable effect on wages. Low-wage 
mothers of young children (up to age five) who lost child care assistance between 1997 and 1999 
saw no statistically significant effect on their wages. Gaining any child care subsidy between 
1997 and 1999 led to a slight decline in wages, compared to mothers with young children 
without subsidies. This may be because there are systemic, but unobserved, differences in 
mothers with subsidies compared to mothers without. 
 
Table 11. The Effects of Child Care Subsidies on Wages for Mothers with Children up to Age 
Five 
    
   Any child care subsidy Government subsidy
Lost assistance between Spring 1997 and 1999  1.2%  -4.7% 
Had assistance in both Spring 1997 and 1999  6.1  -0.4 
Gained assistance between Spring 1997 and 1999  -4.0**  -4.1 
(No assistance in either period omitted)     
    
Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation.  
Notes: Sample includes mothers age 25 to 54, who had children between infancy and age five, and 
who reported using any kind of child care. Low-wage workers are those earning at or less than 
$10.00 per hour in December 1999 constant dollars. Marginal effects are calculated from estimation 
of wages using a two-step Heckman procedure. For full model results, see Appendix B. The 
marginal effects are calculated with all other values except those in this table set at their means. 




This study finds that it is not enough for states to offer work supports for a few months; 
to fulfill their promise, they need to be offered until the woman is self-sufficient. Work supports 
are critical to helping these women take care of their familial responsibilities—such as adequate 
  31health insurance and child care for their children—while holding down a low-wage job. 
However, for most mothers, work supports—in particular, health insurance—phases out before 
private-sector work supports are available. 
 
This study examined the importance of two work supports—health insurance and child 
care—in promoting employment and wage growth for prime-age mothers. Mothers on welfare 
and other low-income mothers are often eligible for Medicaid and child care subsidies however, 
as they move up the job ladder, most become ineligible, even if they do not have private-sector 
support. Some do move onto employer-provided health insurance, there is, however, no private 
sector equivalent to child care subsidies and a mother must be able to afford market prices for 
child care once her subsidy runs out. 
 
This study finds that work supports matter and losing them limits a mother’s ability to 
stay employed. This is more the case for health insurance than for child care. This is most likely 
because the effects of child care subsidies are hampered by the relatively small numbers of 
children who are able to take advantage of them.  
 
Few mothers on make the transition from Medicaid to employer-provided health 
insurance. Between the beginning of 1997 and the end of 1998, 41.5 percent of those on 
Medicaid left the program and less than one third of those (27.7 percent) moved from Medicaid 
into employer-provided health insurance. Between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003, 
37.2 percent of those on Medicaid left the program, but fewer than a quarter (23.4 percent) of 
those had employer-provided health insurance. This falloff in the share moving directly into 
employer-provided health insurance is most likely attributable to the protracted labor market 
recession and falling employer-provided health insurance coverage overall. 
 
The problem was not necessarily that Medicaid leavers lacked employment, but that they 
did not find jobs that offered employer-provided health insurance. Among those who left 
Medicaid in the late 1990s, the share moving from a job without employer-provided health 
insurance to one with was just under one third (28.7 percent), however this fell by 14.0 
percentage points, down to 14.7 percent in the early 2000s. There was not, however, a large 
decline in the share of mothers overall who moved from a job without employer-provided health 
insurance to one with. In the late 1990s, one-in-five (18.3 percent) of all mothers made this 
transition and in the early 2000s, this share only fell by 1.6 percentage points, down to 16.7 
percent.  
 
The transition from Medicaid to employer-provided health insurance is critical because 
mothers who make this transition are nine times more likely to stay employed than mothers who 
leave Medicaid without employer-provided health insurance. Mothers leaving Medicaid with 
employer-provided health insurance are just as likely to stay employed as mothers who have 
employer-provided health insurance and are not Medicaid leavers. All Medicaid leavers suffer a 
wage penalty, however, compared to other mothers. This is true regardless of whether they left 
Medicaid with or without employer-provided health insurance. 
 
Child care subsidies are rarer than Medicaid. Welfare mothers are not more likely than 
mothers who have left welfare to receive child care subsidies. However, since so few—about 
  32one-in-eight—eligible children receives a subsidy, the limited effect may be due to the limited 
numbers receiving help.  
 
Mothers who receive child care subsidies are likely to be able to continue receiving them. 
Most—over 90 percent—mothers who had subsidies in 1997 still had a subsidy two years later in 
1999. Child care subsidies have a positive effect on employment, but losing them does not 
necessarily lead to losing employment. As with Medicaid, mothers who have child care subsidies 
suffer a wage penalty, compared to other mothers. 
 
Work supports matter. The private market does not step up quickly enough to allow the 
majority of women leaving Medicaid the opportunity to participate in an employer-based health 
insurance plan. There is no private-sector equivalent of subsidized child care and for many low-
income mothers, child care expenses can eat up upwards of one-fifth of their family budget. 
Work supports only fulfill their mission if they help mothers both find and maintain 
employment. Rapid phase-outs and relatively low earnings thresholds limit mothers’ ability to 
stay employed, even if they had been successful at finding employment. 
 
 
  33Appendix A: The Survey of Income and Program Participation  
 
This analysis makes use of two panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), 1996 and 2001. The SIPP is a multi-panel, longitudinal survey of the civilian, non-
institutional population in the United States, conducted by the U.S. Census. It is designed to 
examine issues related to participation in income maintenance programs, such as welfare and 
Medicaid and contains extensive information on individuals’ backgrounds, employment and 
earnings, and access to services, including health insurance and child-care. Unlike other 
available longitudinal datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, it covers all workers and contains monthly, rather than annual 
data.
9 The 1996 SIPP panel includes interviews from December 1995 through March 2000. The 
2001 panel includes interviews from December 2000 through January 2004.  
 
Respondents are counted as employed if they reported being at a job for any week(s) 
during the month. Wages are taken from the hourly wage variable if reported; if the respondent 
reports monthly earnings, rather than an hourly wage, wages are calculated from earnings per 
month and usual hours worked (Boushey 2004; Boushey and Schmitt 2004). We only include 
wage information from the respondent’s first job. Wages below $1.00 per hour are recoded as 
missing; wages above $50.00 per hour are recoded to equal $50.00. All dollar values are recoded 
into December 1999 dollars. 
 
Health insurance from an employer must be in one’s own name. Thus, this study excludes 
the substantial share of mothers—about one-third—who receive employer-provided health 
insurance from a spouse or other family member. The rationale behind this is that our analysis is 
examining the effects of receiving employment-based work supports on employment, not the 
effects of simply having benefits. 
 
Medicaid coverage includes both Medicaid and other public health insurance programs. 
The SIPP question refers not only to Medicaid, but also specifically asks the respondent if they 
(or their children) are covered by the program name under which Medicaid operates in their 
locality. They are not, however, specifically asked about participation in the State Child Health 
Insurance Program. 
 
The child care subsidy question asks respondents whether anyone helped them pay for 
their child care expenses. Mothers who receive child care assistance through placing their 
children in a low-cost or subsidized provider may not respond “yes” to this question, even 
though they do in fact receive a subsidy. The child care questions are topical module questions 
and only appear in wave 4 and wave 10 of the 1996 panel, covering the spring of 1997 and 1999, 
and in wave 4 of the 2001 panel, covering the spring of 2002. 
                                                 
9 The SIPP data are structured so that every month one-fourth of the sample is interviewed; over each four-month 
interval (a “wave”), all sample members are interviewed. During each wave, respondents are asked a set of core 
questions, which cover labor market participation, wages, and participation in income support programs; additional 
questions from topical modules change each wave. The first topical module, for example, includes employment and 
welfare history, asks questions that allow identification of a history of welfare use, as well as labor market 
experience prior to the panel. Other modules focus on childcare, assets, training history, etc. 
  34 
The final sample for this analysis is women age 25 to 54 who have children under the age 
of 18 in their subfamily, regardless of whether the children are biologically related to the mother. 
The SIPP allows analysts to identify parents and children; however, detailed data work has found 
that using children within a subfamily is a better measure. Our sample includes 15,613 unique 
mothers in the 1996 panel and 13,540 in the 2001 panel. 
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For all the estimations, the sample is mothers, age 25 to 54. The estimations are run 
separately for the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels. All estimations are weighted using the person 
weight.  
 
The findings reported in the tables in the report are simulations for low-wage mothers, 
earning $10.00 an hour or less in constant 1999 dollars. The regressions, however, include all 
mothers. The results of the simulations are similar for low-wage and all mothers.  
 
Probability of Receiving Benefits 
 
The marginal effects reported in Tables 2, 4, and 8 are calculated from a logit estimates. 
For Table 2, the model predicts the probability of receiving Medicaid, where Medicaid receipt is 
a function of welfare status, employment duration, and controls for personal characteristics. The 
sample for this model includes all observations in our sample. Table B1 reports the full 
regression results.  
 
For Table 4, the model predicts the probability of receiving employer-provided health 
insurance in one’s own name, where having insurance is a function of welfare status, 
employment duration, history of Medicaid usage, and controls for personal characteristics. The 
sample for this model includes all observations in our sample. Table B2 reports the full 
regression results. 
 
For Table 8, the model predicts the probability of receiving any child care subsidy or a 
government child care subsidy, where receipt of child care subsidies is a function of welfare 
status, employment duration, and controls for personal characteristics. The sample for the model 
only includes observations in waves 4 and 10 of the 1996 panel and those in wave 4 in the 2001 
panel. Table B3 reports the full regression results. 
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Table B1. Logit: Probability of Receiving Medicaid 
(Odds ratios reported)       
    
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Welfare status     
Not on welfare  0.073  0.105 
 (0.008)***  (0.015)*** 
Welfare receipient   12.166  7.039 
 (1.851)***  (1.702)*** 
Months since welfare exit     
7 to 12 months (1 - 6 months omitted)  0.672  0.606 
 (0.056)***  (0.092)*** 
13 to 18 months  0.439  0.573 
 (0.056)***  (0.119)*** 
19 to 24 months  0.369  0.527 
 (0.057)***  (0.122)*** 
25 months or more  0.291  0.522 
 (0.057)***  (0.213) 
Continuous months of employment      
7 to 12 months (1 to 6 months omitted)  0.813  0.823 
 (0.038)***  (0.042)*** 
13 to 18 months  0.688  0.632 
 (0.046)***  (0.046)*** 
19 to 24 months  0.649  0.609 
 (0.051)***  (0.052)*** 
25 months or more  0.538  0.651 
 (0.050)***  (0.066)*** 
Controls    
Log of real wages  0.503  0.387 
 (0.026)***  (0.031)*** 
Age 0.958  0.888 
 (0.057)  (0.055)* 
Age squared  1.000  1.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
African American (white omitted)  1.712  2.104 
 (0.207)***  (0.261)*** 
Hispanic 1.407  1.557 
 (0.195)**  (0.239)*** 
Other race  4.445 2.758 
 (0.911)***  (0.630)*** 
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted)  0.451  0.705 
 (0.105)***  (0.174) 
Non-citizen 0.849  0.643 
 (0.148)  (0.110)*** 
High-school (less than high-school omitted)  0.672  0.523 
 (0.079)***  (0.075)*** 
Some college  0.546  0.433 
 (0.071)***  (0.066)*** 
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Table B1. Logit: Probability of Receiving Medicaid, cont.  0.193 0.130 
(Odds ratios reported)       
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted)  2.763  3.211 
 (0.366)***  (0.421)*** 
Widowed 2.674  5.936 
 (0.968)***  (1.365)*** 
Divorced/separated 2.695  3.098 
 (0.262)***  (0.348)*** 
Children 0 to 5  1.471  1.859 
 (0.141)***  (0.198)*** 
Children 6 to 17  1.265  2.120 
 (0.156)*  (0.302)*** 
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)  0.734  0.505 
 (0.165)  (0.119)*** 
E. North Central  0.538  0.399 
 (0.121)***  (0.097)*** 
W. North Central  0.523  0.473 
 (0.132)**  (0.131)*** 
South Atlantic  0.394  0.205 
 (0.091)***  (0.048)*** 
E. South Central  0.882  0.359 
 (0.225)  (0.097)*** 
W. South Central  0.334  0.150 
 (0.082)***  (0.039)*** 
Mountain 0.571  0.466 
 (0.149)**  (0.116)*** 
Pacific 1.067  0.658 
 (0.240)  (0.152)* 
Observations 292903  172052 
Standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
    
 
  38Table B2. Logit: Probability of Receiving Employer-Provided Health Insurance  
(Odds ratios reported)                     
         
   Late 1990s    Early 2000s 
Welfare status            
Not  on  welfare  during  panel             
         
         
         
           
       
         
         
           
     
             
       
             
       
             
             
           
           
           
           
4.126 1.879 5.087 3.017 1.384 5.064
(0.414)***  (0.817)*** (0.225)***  (0.522)*** (0.258)* (0.988)***
Welfare receipient   0.482  0.857 0.595 0.692 1.291 1.159
(0.068)***  (0.110)*** (0.132)  (0.127)** (0.266) (0.254)
Months  since  welfare exit
7 to 12 months (1 - 6 months omitted) 
 
1.451  1.298    0.969  0.874   
(0.113)*** (0.106)***  (0.157)   (0.151)
13 to 18 months  2.023  1.636    1.056  0.941   
(0.235)*** (0.195)***  (0.240)   (0.230)
19 to 24 months  2.578  1.986    1.270  1.134   
(0.334)*** (0.269)***  (0.342)   (0.326)
25 months or more  2.771  2.031    1.291  1.150   
(0.430)*** (0.327)***   (0.478) (0.517)
Continuous months of employment              
7 to 12 months (1 to 6 months omitted) 
 
1.322  1.315  1.325  1.235  1.237  1.234 
(0.020)***  (0.020)*** (0.020)***  (0.023)***   (0.023)*** (0.023)***
13  to  18  months 1.494 1.479 1.497 1.405 1.396 1.403
(0.032)***  (0.032)*** (0.032)***  (0.036)***   (0.036)*** (0.036)***
19  to  24  months 1.642 1.629 1.648 1.504 1.493 1.501
(0.042)***  (0.042)*** (0.042)***  (0.046)***   (0.046)*** (0.046)***
25  months  or  more 1.848 1.835 1.856 1.610 1.609 1.607
(0.056)*** (0.056)*** (0.056)*** (0.058)*** (0.059)*** (0.058)***
Post-Medicaid & months since welfare exit           
1 - 6 months (not on welfare during panel omitted) 
 
  2.054      3.005 
(0.379)*** (0.856)***
7 to 12 months 
 
    2.665      2.753 
(0.472)*** (0.812)***
13 to 18 months 
 
    3.439      2.856 
(0.657)*** (0.906)***
19 to 24 months 
 
    4.110      4.521 
(0.814)*** (1.510)***
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Table B2. Logit: Probability of Receiving Employer-Provided Health Insurance, cont.  
(Odds ratios reported)                     
         
   Late 1990s   
25 months or more      4.422      3.504 
           
           
         
           
         
         
             
             
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
             
         
             
             
           
             
             
             
           
             
             
             
             
             










Log  of  real  wages 2.931 2.818 2.928 2.832 2.609 2.832
(0.131)*** (0.125)*** (0.131)*** (0.141)*** (0.129)*** (0.141)***
Age
 
0.975 0.968 0.978 1.003 0.986 1.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age  squared
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
African  American  (white  omitted)
 
1.440 1.495 1.443 1.527 1.676 1.535
(0.094)*** (0.098)*** (0.094)*** (0.107)*** (0.119)*** (0.108)***
Hispanic 1.408 1.441 1.413 1.202 1.278 1.198
(0.116)*** (0.120)*** (0.117)*** (0.104)** (0.112)*** (0.103)**
Other race  1.431  1.580 1.435 1.100 1.209 1.100
(0.165)*** (0.188)*** (0.166)*** (0.130) (0.146) (0.131)
Naturalized  citizen  (Native  omitted)
 
1.035 0.991 1.032 1.143 1.098 1.141
(0.121) (0.116) (0.120) (0.129) (0.125) (0.129)
Non-citizen 0.717 0.710 0.714 0.807 0.763 0.806
(0.070)*** (0.071)*** (0.070)*** (0.083)** (0.079)*** (0.082)**
High-school  (less  than  high-school  omitted)
 
1.456 1.384 1.455 1.601 1.437 1.613
(0.123)*** (0.118)*** (0.123)*** (0.159)*** (0.146)*** (0.160)***
Some  college 1.403 1.314 1.402 1.644 1.464 1.656
(0.120)*** (0.114)*** (0.120)*** (0.164)*** (0.149)*** (0.165)***
College  degree  or  more 1.429 1.324 1.429 1.583 1.397 1.594
(0.135)*** (0.126)*** (0.135)*** (0.173)*** (0.154)*** (0.174)***
Never  married  (Married/cohabitating  omitted)
 
2.726 3.134 2.718 1.962 2.467 1.969
(0.222)*** (0.258)*** (0.223)*** (0.168)*** (0.217)*** (0.169)***
Early 2000s 
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Table B2. Logit: Probability of Receiving Employer-Provided Health Insurance, cont.   
(Odds ratios reported)                     
         
   Late 1990s    Early 2000s 
Widowed              2.327 2.505 2.318 1.970 2.630 1.974
  (0.422)***           
             
           
                 
           
               
       
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
       
             
         
(0.475)*** (0.421)*** (0.366)*** (0.542)*** (0.367)***
Divorced/separated
 
3.414 3.771 3.426 2.716 3.157 2.714
(0.184)*** (0.207)*** (0.185)*** (0.171)*** (0.205)*** (0.171)***
Children  0 to 5
 
0.827 0.855 0.828 0.843 0.903 0.844
(0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.043)*** (0.053)*** (0.058) (0.054)***
Children  6  to 17 0.837 0.854 0.835 0.806 0.867 0.808
(0.053)***  (0.053)*** (0.054)**  (0.060)***   (0.065)* (0.060)***
Middle  Atlantic  (Northeast  omitted)
 
1.296 1.292 1.297 1.415 1.343 1.415
(0.154)** (0.153)** (0.154)** (0.188)*** (0.180)** (0.188)***
E.  North  Central
 
1.330 1.304 1.330 1.421 1.324 1.425
(0.154)** (0.150)** (0.154)** (0.184)*** (0.173)** (0.185)***
W.  North  Central
 
1.627 1.595 1.625 1.840 1.717 1.845
(0.207)*** (0.202)*** (0.206)*** (0.267)*** (0.252)*** (0.268)***
South  Atlantic
 
1.631 1.590 1.630 1.775 1.605 1.771
(0.188)*** (0.182)*** (0.188)*** (0.226)*** (0.207)*** (0.226)***
E.  South  Central
 
1.461 1.467 1.467 2.096 1.992 2.093
(0.196)*** (0.197)*** (0.197)*** (0.323)*** (0.309)*** (0.323)***
W.  South  Central
 
1.425 1.370 1.426 1.764 1.552 1.760
(0.173)*** (0.166)*** (0.173)*** (0.242)*** (0.215)*** (0.241)***
Mountain
 
1.381 1.363 1.379 1.497 1.416 1.498
(0.186)** (0.184)** (0.186)** (0.229)*** (0.219)** (0.229)***
Pacific 1.264 1.274 1.267 1.459 1.409 1.461
(0.151)*  (0.151)** (0.152)**  (0.192)***   (0.187)*** (0.192)***
Observations 292903 292903 292903 172052 172052 172052
Standard  errors  in  parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%               
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(Odds ratios reported)                
          
  Any child care assistance   Government child care subsidy
   Late 1990s  Early 2000s     Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
Welfare status           
Not on welfare during panel  0.302  0.524    0.129  0.450 
 (0.081)***  (0.199)*    (0.043)***  (0.195)* 
Welfare receipient   0.689 2.039    0.613 1.748 
 (0.195)  (0.949)    (0.190)  (0.917) 
Months since welfare exit           
7 to 12 months (1 - 6 months omitted)  0.881  0.609    0.900  0.449 
 (0.262)  (0.308)    (0.291)  (0.292) 
13 to 18 months  1.179      0.880   
 (0.487)      (0.413)   
19 to 24 months  0.324      0.264   
 (0.164)**      (0.140)**   
25 months or more  0.307      0.176   
  (0.148)**     (0.100)***  
Continuous months of employment            
7 to 12 months (1 to 6 months omitted)  1.055  1.240    1.011  1.400 
 (0.188)  (0.234)    (0.249)  (0.338) 
13 to 18 months  1.197  1.124    1.209  1.221 
 (0.210)  (0.217)    (0.282)  (0.300) 
19 to 24 months  1.144      2.116   
 (0.364)      (0.798)**   
25 months or more  1.363      1.726   
 (0.258)      (0.459)**   
          
Log of real wages  0.941  0.828    0.738  0.590 
 (0.095)  (0.095)*    (0.092)**  (0.077)*** 
Age 0.844  0.946    0.971  0.778 
 (0.072)**  (0.102)    (0.110)  (0.115)* 
Age squared  1.002  1.001    1.001  1.003 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)    (0.002)  (0.002) 
African American (white omitted)  0.679  1.160    0.850  1.506 
 (0.117)**  (0.242)    (0.193)  (0.382) 
Hispanic 0.606  0.804    0.813  0.695 
 (0.134)**  (0.197)    (0.260)  (0.240) 
Other race  0.570  1.341  0.267 1.623 
 (0.193)*  (0.443)    (0.169)**  (0.678) 
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted)  1.309  0.756    1.709  0.665 
 (0.459)  (0.309)    (0.918)  (0.420) 
Non-citizen 0.906  1.240    0.876  1.467 
 (0.227)  (0.342)    (0.316)  (0.539) 
High-school (less than high-school omitted)  1.096  1.716    1.204  1.932 
 (0.252)  (0.553)*    (0.336)  (0.806) 
Some college  1.302  1.546    1.547  1.409 
 (0.297)  (0.502)    (0.448)  (0.605) 
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Table B3. Logit: Probability of Receiving Child care Subsidies, cont.  
(Odds ratios reported)               
  Any child care assistance  Government child care subsidy 
  Late 1990s  Early 2000s    Late 1990s  Early 2000s 
College degree or more  1.095  1.476  0.719  1.522 
 (0.273)  (0.542)  (0.267)  (0.758) 
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted)  2.600  2.654  3.032  3.462 
 (0.489)***  (0.591)***  (0.789)***  (0.944)*** 
Widowed 2.314  2.031  3.633  0.792 
 (0.982)**  (1.268)  (1.880)**  (0.796) 
Divorced/separated 2.709  2.053  2.600  3.059 
 (0.393)***  (0.369)***  (0.554)***  (0.706)*** 
Children 0 to 5  2.529  4.146  3.292  3.122 
 (0.354)***  (0.790)***  (0.664)***  (0.785)*** 
Children 6 to 17  1.040  1.342  1.050  1.845 
 (0.147)  (0.238)*  (0.221)  (0.476)** 
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)  0.531  0.653  0.535  1.920 
 (0.145)**  (0.247)  (0.218)  (1.201) 
E. North Central  0.680  0.676  0.577  2.010 
 (0.172)  (0.252)  (0.220)  (1.239) 
W. North Central  0.498  0.779  0.852  1.704 
 (0.145)**  (0.322)  (0.344)  (1.181) 
South Atlantic  0.721  0.870  0.675  1.047 
 (0.185)  (0.317)  (0.257)  (0.656) 
E. South Central  0.275  0.643  0.174  1.163 
 (0.105)***  (0.279)  (0.111)***  (0.806) 
W. South Central  0.474  0.729  0.374  1.905 
 (0.139)**  (0.288)  (0.166)**  (1.225) 
Mountain 0.677  0.497  0.421  1.167 
 (0.215)  (0.230)  (0.209)*  (0.843) 
Pacific 0.846  1.265  0.839  3.324 
 (0.220)  (0.459)  (0.327)  (2.022)** 
Observations 41416  16952  41416  16952 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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The marginal effects reported in Figures 2, 3 and 6 and Table 10 are calculated from logit 
estimates of employment duration. The probability of staying employed is a function of whether 
received the mother received Medicaid either currently or previously, welfare history, log wages, 
and personal and job characteristics.  
 
Individuals are allowed to have multiple spells of employment.
10 Individuals may have 
multiple spells because they either moved in and out of employment more than once or because 
they moved in and out of the survey during the panel. For example, a respondent may be 
interviewed in waves one through six, out of the survey for wave seven, and then interviewed in 
waves eight through 12. In this case, the individual has two person-in-sample spells, each with a 
separate id, and each of which are treated as a different unit and each of which has its own 
censoring point. For the purposes of clustering, however, we use the individual’s unique id, not 
person-in-sample id.  
 
Duration data requires that we control for time dependence—the fact that exiting 
employment may be more (or less) likely depending on how long the person has been 
employed.
11 The model must estimate the conditional probability—the probability that someone 
is employed in month t given that she was employed in month t-1; that is, Pr(empt=1 | empt-
1=1).
12 We can account for time dependence either by using an explicit duration model (e.g. Cox 
or Weibull) or with time dummies in a logit or probit model. From an analytic perspective, the 
method we choose is irrelevant as estimating a conditional probability using logit or probit, while 
controlling for duration dependence using time dummies or the equivalent, is equivalent to using 
standard parametric (or semi-parametric) duration models such as the Weibull model or the Cox 
proportional hazards model (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 1999).
13, 14  
                                                 
10 We tested various models on three binary dependent variables and found that how we measured employment did 
not change our results significantly. We tested two measures of employment duration and one of measure job 
duration: employed all month, employed part of the month, and job.  
11 There is some controversy about whether or not to make substantive interpretations of statistically significant time 
dependence in the data. I am of the opinion that time dependence is simply a proxy for some unmeasured variable 
(or variables) that are roughly collinear with time. Being unmeasured (and perhaps unknown), we can only speculate 
on interpretation of time dependence. All of the models that we test display significant time dependence. 
12 In the logit models, we control for time dependence using temporal dummies. It is necessary to omit any number 
of dummies that perfectly predict an outcome (e.g. all observations with the time dummy for time==43 fail). 
Because we are not interested in the substantive interpretation of time dependence, omitting dummies to obtain 
tractable models is not a problem. 
13 Using a logit or probit model while controlling for the effects of time dependence is the functional equivalent of 
using a standard (semi-) parametric duration model such as a Cox model or a Weibull model. In fact, the binary 
dependent variable models (logit and probit) make the same time dependence assumptions as the Cox model when 
we use time dummies to control for time dependence. That is, the effects of time (how long the subject has lasted up 
to time t) on failure are treated the same way: we estimate the effect of each time period (t1 to tn) separately by 
giving each time period a dummy in the binary models. In an exponential model we assume the effect of time on the 
probability of failure is constant across time periods. In a Weibull model we assume the effect of time on the 
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The logit model, with time dummies, is the easiest model to estimate because it takes the 
least computational time. In this model, the data is structured such that we drop all observations 
where the person does not have a job in the previous month i.e. the value for the dependent 
variable is zero the previous month (Yt-1=0).  
 
For the estimation of the effects of child care subsidies on employment, we only have 
data for one wave in the 2001 panel, and two waves in the 1996 panel.
15 However, even if we 
only have information about a covariate for particular months, say even numbered months 
(Figure B1, shaded), we can still conduct duration analysis because we still have the necessary 
information: whether or not the person was employed and the employment duration. Here, 
individual 01 had two employment spells, one for 3 months (months 1-3, failed in month 4) and 
one for 2 months (months 16-17, failed in month 18). Individual 07 had one employment spell 
for 4 months (6-9, failed in month10); and individual 18 had one employment spell for 3 months 
(months 46-48, no failure, censored by leaving the sample). X1 is a covariate that varies by 
individual, such as gender, and X2 is a covariate that varies over time and individual, such as 
household income.  
 





Wave  X1 X 2 
01  1  1  1 1 6 
01  1  2  2  1  9 
01 1  3  3  1  12 
01  0  4  4  1  2 
01  1  1  16  1  10 
01  1  2  17 1 12 
01  0  3  18  1  1 
07  1  1  6  0  8 
07  1  2  7 0 9 
07  1  3  8  0  8 
07 1  4  9  0  10 
07  0  5  10  0  3 
18  1  1  46  1  21 
18  1  2  47 1 20 
18  1  3  48  1  19 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
probability of failure is not constant, but rather either increasing or decreasing monotonically. In a Cox model, again 
the effect of time is modeled separately for each time period (t1 to tn). 
14 We also estimated employment using Cox models, controlling for state (with dummies for each of the 47 state 
groupings), and they do not change the size of the coefficients, much less their signs or significance (results not 
shown). These models did not display non-proportional hazards, and none of the covariates suffer from non-
proportionality. However, we were unable to test for unit-level heterogeneity in the data, due to size restrictions in 
the statistical software we use. All of this indicates that the logit specification is the appropriate method to use. 
15 We also have information from the core files on a third variable (epatyp5), but there is information on this 
variable only for waves 9-12. It is unclear what the error with this variable is. 
  45 
A possible issue in our model is sample selection. We are interested in the effect of 
having employer-provided health insurance, Medicaid, or subsidized child care on employment 
and job tenure. For much of the data in the 1996 panel, we have information on these variables 
only for a subset of the individuals (and employment/job spells) in the panel. If the sub-sample 
that we use for estimation is systematically different (in some covariates) than the population of 
the panel as a whole, then our coefficient estimates may be biased. To account for this potential 
problem, we should estimate Heckman probit models, using demographic data, income, poverty, 
and welfare history in the selection equations. However, due to computation time, these models 
are not possible to run.   
  46Table B4. Logit: Probability of Remaining Employed 
(Odds ratios reported) 
         
   Late 1990s    Early 2000s 
Medicaid  status         
Post-Medicaid (never on Medicaid omitted) 
 
    0.620      0.689 
     
           
     
         
         
           
       
           
       
           
       
           
         
         
         
     
     
     
         






Medicaid  and  EPHI  status
Post-Medicaid, has EHPI (Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted) 
 
0.661      0.770   
(0.092)*** (0.149)












On  Medicaid,  no  EHPI 0.113 0.131
(0.008)*** (0.010)***
Medicaid and EPHI status, by state generosity             
Most generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI  0.723      0.831     
(Most generous: Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted)  (0.230)      (0.345)     
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
0.959      0.915     
(0.253) (0.284)
Least generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
0.599      1.006     
(0.123)** (0.318)
Most generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.156      0.234     
(0.024)*** (0.045)***
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.160      0.221     
(0.023)*** (0.036)***
Least generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.162      0.190     
(0.021)*** (0.030)***
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
1.104      1.210     
(0.140) (0.166)
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Table B4. Logit: Probability of Remaining Employed, cont.  
(Odds ratios reported) 
            
   Late 1990s    Early 2000s 
Least generous: Never Medicaid, has EHPI  1.145      1.338     
 (0.144)         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
           
       
         
     
           
           
         
           
  (0.182)**
Most generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.209      0.251     
(0.023)***   (0.031)***
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.222      0.252     
(0.024)***   (0.030)***
Least generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.225      0.262     
(0.024)***   (0.030)***
Most generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
0.371      0.690     
(0.150)**   (0.443)
Moderately generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
0.341      0.724     
(0.097)***   (0.365)
Least generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI 
 
0.392      0.432     
(0.116)***   (0.166)**
Most generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.132      0.196     
(0.017)***   (0.030)***
Moderately generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.120      0.141     
(0.015)***   (0.019)***
Least generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI 
 
0.123      0.150     
(0.016)***   (0.022)***
Log of real wages  1.243  1.240  1.471  1.062  1.062  1.312 
(0.037)***  (0.045) (0.037)***  (0.044) (0.034)*** (0.044)***
  Age 1.107 1.108 1.100 1.075 1.076 1.070
(0.028)***  (0.032)** (0.028)***  (0.032)** (0.028)*** (0.032)**
Age squared  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 
(0.000)***  (0.000)* (0.000)***  (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*
African American (white omitted) 
 
0.873  0.874  0.957  0.900  0.899  1.032 
(0.047)**  (0.054)*
 
(0.046)**  (0.054)* (0.050)  (0.060)
Hispanic
 
0.963 0.958 1.025 0.978 0.980 1.036
(0.058) (0.057) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070)
Other race 
 
0.948  0.943 1.056 1.101 1.083 1.139
(0.085) (0.085) (0.096) (0.104) (0.103) (0.108)
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Table B4. Logit: Probability of Remaining Employed, cont. 
(Odds ratios reported) 
         
   Late 1990s   
 
Early 2000s 
Naturalized  citizen  (Native  omitted)            1.139 1.132 1.133 0.929 0.928 0.940
  (0.108)           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
           
             
         
             
           
             
       
           
           
             
           
             
       
         
(0.108) (0.109) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092)
Non-citizen
 
1.008 1.004 0.916 0.865 0.881 0.813
(0.073) (0.071) (0.064) (0.066)* (0.066)* (0.061)***
High-school  (less  than  high-school  omitted)
 
1.389 1.386 1.466 1.269 1.267 1.368
(0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.078)*** (0.087)*** (0.087)*** (0.093)***
Some  college
 
1.351 1.348 1.460 1.345 1.343 1.483
(0.073)*** (0.073)*** (0.079)*** (0.096)*** (0.095)*** (0.104)***
College  degree  or  more
 
1.424 1.423 1.596 1.295 1.292 1.460
(0.094)*** (0.094)*** (0.104)*** (0.105)*** (0.105)*** (0.115)***
Never  married  (Married/cohabitating  omitted)
 
1.109 1.106 1.358 0.884 0.883 1.059
(0.075) (0.074) (0.088)***  (0.073) (0.064)* (0.064)*
Widowed
 
0.952 0.952 1.162 0.837 0.844 1.016
(0.165) (0.164) (0.201) (0.173) (0.177) (0.217)
Divorced/separated 0.953 0.954 1.270 0.791 0.788 1.038
(0.048)  (0.047)*** (0.048)  (0.046)*** (0.061)***  (0.058)
Children 6 to 17 only (children 0 to 5 only omitted) 
 
1.250  1.253  1.239  1.082  1.085  1.085 
(0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.064)*** (0.070) (0.070) (0.067)
Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17 
 
1.108  1.108  1.067  1.018  1.020  0.993 
(0.057)** (0.057)** (0.054) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061)
Time
 
1.022 1.022 1.028 1.028 1.028 1.034
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Observations 300790 300790 300790 177085 177085 177085
Controlling for  two-digit occupation and industries in the regression 
 
         
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                  
  49Estimating Wages 
 
  The marginal effects reported in Figures 4 and 5 and Table 11 are calculated from 
Heckman two-step wage regressions, with the probability of being employed as step one 
(Heckman 1979). Given that we cannot observe the wages of women who are not employed, and 
that women who are not employed are likely to have lower wages than those who are employed, 
the estimation of wages much account for this bias. The solution to this model is to find variables 
that strongly affect the chances for observation—which here is the reservation wage—but not the 
observed outcome—which here is the actual wage. Given that this analysis is modeling women’s 
wages, the specification follows directly from Heckman’s analysis and uses characteristics of the 
woman’s family—the number and age of her children and marital status—to identify the 
probability that a woman is employed and thus has an observed wage.  
 
  The Heckman selection model also addresses the problem of attrition. Through 
incorporating selection into employment into the analysis of wages, the model also accounts for 
selection into the panel as well. The full regression results are reported in Tables B6 and B7. 
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Table B5. Logit: Probability of Remaining Employed    
(Odds ratios reported)         
Wave 4  Waves 4 & 10 Wave 10 Wave 10  Wave 4  Waves 4 & 10 Wave 10
     













      1.894           
 (no child care subsidy in either wave omitted)      (0.864)           
Child care subsidy in wave 4 & wave 10 
 
    0.467         
(0.291)
Child care subsidy in wave 10, not in wave 4 
 
         
(0.981)*
Government child care assitance     








Any  child  care  assistance
 
            
                
                
                    
                
                   
               
              
              
                 
                
                
                 
          2 1 7 ) *     
              
     
               
           
                   
             
Child care subsidy in wave 4, not in wave 10    
   
     
  2.158       
               
      1.449   
(0.583) (1.023)**
Had any government cc subsidy in wave 10 
 
      2.417 
            0.763       
(0.303)
Government child care subsidy in wave 4, not in wave 10             0.981     
(no child care subsidy in either wave omitted)                (0.507)     
Government child care subsidy in wave 4 & wave 10 
 
            0.303     
( 0 .
Government child care subsidy in wave 10, not in wave 4 
 
            1.093     
(0.463)
Log of real wages  1.806  1.816  1.727  1.726  1.006  1.006  1.005  1.006  1.400  1.404 







Age 1.240 1.187 1.094 1.093 1.238 1.186 1.094 1.100 0.986 0.991
(0.100)*** (0.077)***  (0.100)***
 
(0.118)    (0.076)*** (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.096) (0.097)
Age  squared 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.999 1.001 1.000
(0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)  (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table B5. Logit: Probability of Remaining Employed    
(Odds ratios reported)         
  Wave 4  Waves 4 & 10 Wave 10 Wave 10  Wave 4  Waves 4 & 10 Wave 10 Wave 10 Wave 4  Wave 4 
African American (white omitted) 
 
0.785  0.855  0.998  1.025  0.782  0.852  0.996  1.009  0.613  0.612 
(0.120)                 
                     
                   
                 
                   
                   
                     
                   
             
                   
                   
             
                   
                     
                   
                     
                   
         
                   
                     
 
               
(0.103) (0.195) (0.200) (0.119) (0.103) (0.195) (0.197) (0.105)*** (0.104)***
Hispanic
 
0.894 0.837 0.796 0.800 0.891 0.831 0.789 0.789 0.933 0.935
(0.169) (0.122) (0.181) (0.181) (0.168) (0.122) (0.179) (0.179) (0.218) (0.219)
Other race 
 
1.336  1.123 0.945 0.938 1.342 1.118 0.930 0.932 0.533 0.534
(0.408) (0.271) (0.357) (0.357) (0.407) (0.269) (0.351) (0.353) (0.140)** (0.141)**
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted) 
 
0.668  0.940  1.438  1.425  0.666  0.942  1.462  1.443  0.689  0.690 
(0.181) (0.223) (0.642) (0.638) (0.180) (0.223) (0.651) (0.644) (0.199) (0.200)
Non-citizen
 
0.966 1.174 1.599 1.585 0.967 1.174 1.602 1.593 0.739 0.738
(0.221) (0.207) (0.456) (0.451) (0.222) (0.208) (0.459)* (0.456) (0.178) (0.179)
High-school (less than high-school omitted) 
 
1.384  1.368  1.232  1.230  1.387  1.369  1.230  1.246  1.108  1.111 
(0.228)** (0.178)**  (0.228)**
 
(0.262) (0.262) (0.178)** (0.262) (0.267) (0.226) (0.227)
Some  college
 
1.349 1.386 1.277 1.285 1.356 1.391 1.281 1.303 1.401 1.409
(0.228)* (0.186)** (0.279) (0.276) (0.229)* (0.186)** (0.279) (0.281) (0.305) (0.308)
College degree or more  1.764  1.609  1.315  1.294  1.775  1.607  1.301  1.313  1.378  1.381 
(0.380)*** (0.271)***  (0.382)*** (0.353) (0.348)  (0.270)*** (0.350) (0.353) (0.343) (0.345)
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted) 
 
0.866  0.821  0.820  0.803  0.873  0.838  0.851  0.865  0.609  0.607 
(0.155) (0.115) (0.188) (0.185) (0.156) (0.117) (0.194) (0.200) (0.120)** (0.120)**
Widowed
 
1.418 1.454 1.996 1.978 1.421 1.475 2.011 1.996 0.450 0.461
(0.823) (0.723) (2.011) (1.994) (0.826) (0.736) (2.025) (2.009) (0.214)* (0.220)
Divorced/separated
 
1.195 1.082 0.997 1.002 1.203 1.099 1.020 1.038 0.802 0.800
(0.188) (0.134) (0.182) (0.185) (0.188) (0.137) (0.187) (0.193) (0.141) (0.140)
Children 6 to 17 only (children 0 to 5 only omitted)
 
1.350  1.416  1.530  1.518  1.341  1.398  1.503  1.488  1.275  1.246 
(0.210)*  (0.296)** (0.175)***  (0.209)* (0.296)** (0.172)*** (0.291)** (0.289)** (0.244) (0.237)
Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17 
 
1.023  1.049  1.163  1.162  1.020  1.049  1.166  1.175  0.995  0.987 
(0.156) (0.126) (0.221) (0.221) (0.156) (0.126) (0.222) (0.224) (0.182) (0.182)
Time 1.111 1.048 1.045 1.045 1.111 1.048 1.045 1.045 1.075 1.075







Observations 22883 42588 19705 19705 22883 42588 19705 19705 17441 17441
Controlling for  two-digit occupation and industries in the regression                 
Robust standard errors in parentheses                     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                           
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Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 














Medicaid  status        
Post-Medicaid (never on Medicaid omitted)          -0.115   
       (0.011)***  
On  Medicaid       -0.179   
       (0.014)***  
Medicaid  and  EPHI  status        
Post-Medicaid, has EHPI (Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted)    -0.129       
     (0.016)***     
Post-Medicaid, no EHPI      -0.257       
     (0.013)***     
Never Medicaid, no EHPI      -0.162       
     (0.008)***     
On Medicaid, has EHPI      -0.089       
     (0.031)***     
On Medicaid, no EHPI      -0.312       
     (0.016)***     
Medicaid and EPHI status, by state generosity             
Most generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.163           
(Most generous: Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted)  (0.031)***          
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.162           
  (0.031)***      
Least generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.199           
  (0.029)***      
Most generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.295           
  (0.029)***      
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.298           
  (0.024)***      
Least generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.319           
  (0.024)***      
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.048           
  (0.017)***      
Least generous: Never Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.074           
  (0.018)***      
Most generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.187           
  (0.018)***      
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.209           
  (0.019)***      
Least generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.225           
  (0.019)***      
Most generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.180           
  (0.050)***      
Moderately generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.010           
  (0.054)       
Least generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.234           
  (0.051)***      
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Table B6--A. Wage Regressions, with Medicaid and EPHI, cont.  
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 














Most generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.370           
  (0.026)***       
Moderately generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.299           
  (0.023)***       
Least generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.405           
 (0.032)***           
Age  0.038 0.030 0.038  0.030  0.036  0.029 
  (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)***  (0.006)*** (0.010)*** 
Age  squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
African American (white omitted)  -0.011  0.171  -0.011  0.171  -0.001  0.174 
 (0.010)  (0.023)***  (0.010)  (0.023)*** (0.011)  (0.022)*** 
Hispanic -0.032  0.108  -0.029  0.108  -0.026  0.109 
 (0.015)**  (0.027)***  (0.015)**  (0.027)*** (0.015)*  (0.027)*** 
Other race  -0.014  0.109  -0.010 0.109  -0.006  0.109 
 (0.021)  (0.038)***  (0.021)  (0.038)*** (0.022)  (0.038)*** 
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted)  0.023  -0.067  0.024  -0.067  0.024  -0.068 
 (0.022)  (0.040)*  (0.022)  (0.040)*  (0.022)  (0.040)* 
Non-citizen  -0.116 -0.261 -0.116 -0.261  -0.125  -0.262 










-0.133  0.096 
(0.023)***
South Atlantic 
(0.018)*** (0.031)***  (0.018)*** (0.031)*** 
High-school (less than high-school omitted)  0.487  0.094  0.487  0.100  0.487 
  (0.013)*** (0.026)*** (0.013)*** (0.026)***  (0.014)*** (0.026)*** 
Some  college  0.172 0.646  0.646  0.180  0.645 
  (0.015)***  (0.015)*** (0.026)***  (0.015)*** (0.026)*** 
College degree or more  0.800  0.423  0.800  0.433  0.798 
  (0.018)*** (0.028)*** (0.018)*** (0.028)***  (0.019)*** (0.028)*** 
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted)    0.080    0.081    0.074 
   (0.028)***    (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
Widowed   -0.078    -0.078    -0.086 
   (0.060)    (0.060)    (0.060) 
Divorced/separated   0.327    0.327    0.321 
   (0.018)***    (0.018)***    (0.018)*** 
  0.310    0.310    0.310 
   (0.019)***    (0.019)***    (0.019)*** 
Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17    -0.117    -0.117    -0.117 
   (0.020)***    (0.020)***   
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)  -0.036 -0.145 -0.052  -0.145  -0.050  -0.146 
(0.022)  (0.038)***  (0.022)**  (0.038)***  (0.038)*** 
E. North Central  -0.103  -0.121 -0.063  -0.121  -0.063 
 (0.021)***  (0.037)*  (0.021)*** (0.037)*  (0.021)*** (0.037)* 
W. North Central  0.096  -0.159  0.096  -0.156 
 (0.024)***  (0.040)**   (0.040)**  (0.023)*** (0.040)** 
-0.120  -0.099  -0.144 -0.099  -0.138  -0.099 
  (0.021)*** (0.037)*** (0.020)*** (0.037)***  (0.021)*** (0.037)*** 
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Table B6--A. Wage Regressions, with Medicaid and EPHI, cont.  
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 














E. South Central  -0.227  -0.098  -0.249 -0.098  -0.253  -0.098 
(0.024)*** (0.043)**  (0.023)*** (0.043)**  (0.043)** 
W. South Central  -0.150  -0.190 -0.149  -0.190  -0.149 
 (0.025)*** (0.039)***  (0.022)***  (0.039)*** (0.023)*** (0.039)*** 
Mountain  -0.099  -0.123 -0.099  -0.119 
 (0.026)*** (0.043)**  (0.024)*** (0.043)**  (0.025)*** (0.043)** 
Pacific -0.013  -0.213  -0.007 -0.213  -0.213 
  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.038)*** (0.022)  (0.038)*** 
Union  member  0.146   0.149  0.183   
    (0.011)***    (0.012)***
Part-time  -0.029   -0.084   
(0.009)***   (0.009)***   
 
  
Constant  1.629  1.541 
(0.113)*** (0.113)***  ( (0.114)*** (0.182)*** 
         
450318 450318  450318  450318 
      
           
     
  (0.024)***
-0.149 






  (0.009)***  
      
23 dummies for two-digit industries and 14 dummies for two-digit occupations excluded from output, but included in regressions 
        
-0.667  1.598 -0.667  -0.659 
  (0.182)***  0.182)*** 
 
Observations  450318 450318 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 

















   
     
     
On  Medicaid        -0.215   
   
Medicaid  and  EPHI  status       
 
     (0.019)***     
    -0.292 
  (0.020)***       
Never Medicaid, no EHPI           
      
    -0.146       
   (0.032)***     
On Medicaid, no EHPI    -0.340   
        
Medicaid  status      
Post-Medicaid (never on Medicaid omitted)      -0.152 
    (0.015)***
    (0.017)***  
  
Post-Medicaid, has EHPI (Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted)   -0.163     
 
Post-Medicaid, no EHPI       
  
-0.168 
(0.010)***     
On Medicaid, has EHPI 
   
     
  (0.018)*** 
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Least generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI   
       
     
     
 
  (0.036)***      
Least generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI   
(0.034)***      
 
-0.053   
 
   
-0.230   
     
   
Most generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI   
 
     
-0.180         
(Most generous: Never Medicaid, has EPHI omitted)          
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, has EHPI -0.220         
  (0.031)***       
-0.213         
(0.032)*** 
Most generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.317     
  (0.039)*** 
Moderately generous: Post-Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.321         
 
-0.368         
   
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, has 
EHPI  -0.066       
  (0.020)***       
Least generous: Never Medicaid, has EHPI         
  (0.021)**       
Most generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.186         
(0.021)***       
Moderately generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI        
  (0.022)*** 
Least generous: Never Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.217           
(0.022)***       
-0.216         
  (0.067)***      
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Table B6--B. Wage Regressions, with Medicaid and EPHI, cont. 
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 














Moderately generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.206           
     
Least generous: On Medicaid, has EHPI  -0.171         
     
Most generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.379           
  (0.031)***       
Moderately generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.392           
(0.034)***      
Least generous: On Medicaid, no EHPI  -0.379           
  (0.031)***       
Age  0.025  0.008 0.025 0.008 0.024 0.008 
 (0.006)***  (0.011)  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** (0.011) 
-0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
African  American  (white  omitted)  -0.030  0.241 -0.029 0.241 -0.018 0.243 
 (0.013)**  (0.025)***  (0.013)**  (0.025)*** (0.013) (0.025)*** 
-0.009  0.159 -0.008  -0.006 0.159 
  (0.029)*** (0.017) (0.029)*** (0.017) (0.029)*** 
Other race  -0.012  0.095  -0.010 0.095 -0.010 
  (0.026)  (0.041)** (0.027) (0.041)** (0.027) (0.041)** 
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted)  0.000  -0.142  0.003  -0.142  0.003  -0.143 
  (0.039)*** (0.023) (0.039)***  (0.039)*** 
Non-citizen  -0.342  -0.070 -0.342 -0.080 -0.343 
 (0.023)***  (0.023)*** (0.034)*** (0.023)*** (0.034)*** 
High-school (less than high-school omitted)  0.088  0.402  0.089  0.402  0.096  0.402 
 (0.017)***  (0.031)***  (0.017)*** (0.031)***  (0.031)*** 
Some  college  0.578 0.185 0.578  0.577 
 (0.018)***  (0.018)*** (0.031)*** (0.019)*** (0.031)*** 
College  degree  or  more  0.447 0.587  0.586 
  (0.022)*** (0.033)***  (0.033)*** 
Never  married  (Married/cohabitating  omitted)    0.097  0.097  0.091 
  (0.032)***  (0.032)*** 
Widowed    0.003  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.071) 
Divorced/separated    0.340  0.340  0.334 
    (0.021)***  (0.021)***  (0.021)*** 
Children 6 to 17 only (children 0 to 5 only omitted)    0.334    0.334    0.335 
    (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.024)*** 
Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17    -0.112    -0.111    -0.112 
    (0.024)***  (0.024)***  (0.024)*** 
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)  -0.133  -0.133 -0.143 -0.133 -0.138 -0.133 
  (0.026)*** (0.045)*** (0.027)***
E. North Central  -0.158  -0.018  -0.166 -0.018 -0.165 -0.019 
 (0.027)***  (0.044)  (0.026)*** (0.044) (0.026)*** (0.044) 
  (0.071)*** 
 
  (0.038)*** 
    
(0.011) 
Age squared  -0.000 
(0.000)*** 
Hispanic  0.159 
(0.017) 
0.095 




0.185  0.197 
(0.031)*** 
0.446  0.587  0.461 
(0.022)***  (0.033)***  (0.022)***
  (0.032)***    
 
 
(0.027)***  (0.045)***  (0.045)*** 













Table B6--B. Wage Regressions, with Medicaid and EPHI, cont. 




W.  North  Central  -0.213  0.137  -0.225 0.137  -0.232 0.137 
 (0.029)***  (0.047)***  (0.028)***  (0.047)*** 
-0.230 -0.053 
 (0.027)***  (0.026)***
E. South Central  -0.299  -0.119 
(0.051)**  (0.030)***  (0.051)** 
-0.274 
(0.028)*** (0.047)*** (0.028)***
Mountain -0.186  -0.118 
 (0.031)***  (0.051)**  (0.029)*** (0.051)** (0.030)*** (0.051)** 
 
0.123 
   
 
(0.011)   
   
  
Constant  -0.279  -0.273 
 (0.135)***  (0.213)  (0.213)  (0.213) 
         
271935  271935 271935  271935 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
   
(0.047)*** (0.028)***
South Atlantic  -0.209  -0.053  -0.221 -0.053 
(0.043)  (0.026)*** (0.043)  (0.043) 
-0.118  -0.320 -0.118 -0.309 
 (0.031)***  (0.051)** (0.031)***
W. South Central  -0.258  -0.194  -0.194 -0.267 -0.195 
 (0.030)***  (0.047)***  (0.047)*** 
-0.118  -0.204  -0.195 -0.118 
Pacific -0.090  -0.169  -0.077 -0.169 -0.067 -0.169 
(0.027)***  (0.045)***  (0.026)*** (0.045)***  (0.027)** (0.045)*** 
Union  member  0.094   0.092    
  (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.014)***
Part-time  -0.015  -0.016  -0.076  
 (0.011)    (0.011)***  
       
23 dummies for two-digit industries and 14 dummies for two-digit occupations excluded from output, but included in regressions 
        
1.999  -0.279 1.960  1.879 
(0.135)***  (0.137)***
Observations  271935  271935 
 
     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Equation  Wage  Equation






Any child care assistance  -0.043       
 (0.033)   
Child care subsidy in Spring 1997, not Spring 1999 (no 
child care subsidy in either wave omitted)    
Child care subsidy in both Spring 1997 & 1999 
 
Receives government help paying for child care      -0.133 
  
 
(no Gov't subsidy in either wave omitted       
   
   
   
(0.010)*** 
-0.000  -0.000 
   
  
       
Child care subsidy in Spring 1999, not 1997       
 
  (0.040)*** 
Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 1997, not Spring 1999)      
 
Gov't child care subsidy in both Spring 1997 & 1999     
Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 1999, not 1997     
     
Age 0.034  0.023  0.034  0.023 
 (0.010)***  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Age squared  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
African American (white omitted)  -0.017  0.182  -0.016  0.182 
 (0.017)  (0.029)***  (0.017)  (0.029)*** 
Hispanic -0.031  0.146  -0.031  0.146 
 (0.021)  (0.033)***  (0.021)  (0.033)*** 
Other race  -0.010  0.182 -0.011  0.182 
 (0.030)  (0.047)***  (0.030)  (0.047)*** 
Naturalized citizen (Native omitted)  0.076  -0.104  0.075  -0.104 
 (0.029)***  (0.049)**  (0.029)***  (0.049)** 
Non-citizen -0.128  -0.373  -0.129  -0.373 
 (0.027)***  (0.039)***  (0.027)***  (0.039)*** 
High-school (less than high-school omitted)  0.131  0.503  0.131  0.503 
 (0.023)***  (0.034)***  (0.023)***  (0.034)*** 
Some college  0.205  0.666  0.205  0.666 
 (0.025)***  (0.034)***  (0.025)***  (0.034)*** 
College degree or more  0.481  0.837  0.481  0.837 
 (0.030)***  (0.037)***  (0.030)***  (0.037)*** 
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted)    -0.034    -0.035 
   (0.038)    (0.038) 
Widowed   -0.026    -0.026 
   (0.089)    (0.088) 
Divorced/separated   0.345    0.345 
   (0.025)***    (0.025)*** 
Children 6 to 17 only (children 0 to 5 only omitted)    0.315    0.315 
   (0.026)***    (0.026)*** 
Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17    -0.139    -0.139 
   (0.027)***    (0.027)*** 
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Table B7-A. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies, cont.  
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 





employment Wage  Equation
Selection: 
employment 
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)  -0.031  -0.146  -0.030  -0.146 
 (0.033)  (0.046)***  (0.033) 
Observations 
(0.046)*** 
E. North Central  -0.102  -0.096  -0.101  -0.096 
 (0.031)***  (0.045)**  (0.031)***  (0.045)** 
W. North Central  -0.119  0.071  -0.117  0.071 
 (0.035)***  (0.049)  (0.035)***  (0.049) 
South Atlantic  -0.117  -0.108  -0.117  -0.108 
 (0.031)***  (0.045)**  (0.031)***  (0.045)** 
E. South Central  -0.236  -0.090  -0.237  -0.090 
 (0.036)***  (0.053)*  (0.036)***  (0.053)* 
W. South Central  -0.149  -0.158  -0.149  -0.158 
 (0.034)***  (0.047)***  (0.034)***  (0.047)*** 
Mountain -0.080  -0.063  -0.080  -0.063 
 (0.037)**  (0.053)  (0.037)**  (0.053) 
Pacific 0.030  -0.244  0.031  -0.244 
 (0.033)  (0.046)***  (0.033)  (0.046)*** 
Union member  0.220    0.220   
 (0.020)***    (0.020)***   
Part-time   -0.103    -0.103   
 (0.016)***    (0.015)***   
        
23 dummies for two-digit industries and 14 dummies for two-digit occupations excluded from output, but included in 
regressions 
      
Constant 1.504  -0.488  1.510  -0.487 
 (0.192)***  (0.259)*  (0.191)***  (0.259)* 
        
35101  35101  35101  35101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10% **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
  63Table B7-B. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies 
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 


















Any  child  care  assistance         -0.034       
  ( 0 . 0 2 9 )           
            
            
            
              
            
          
            
              
           
        . 0 6 6 )    
        0 . 0 0 5    
        . 0 9 8 )    
Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 
1999, not 1997          - 0 . 0 6 2    
          ( 0 . 0 4 1 )    
                 
  (0 **    (0 **  
Age  squared                 
       
             
               
Child care subsidy in Spring 1997, not 
Spring 1999 (no child care subsidy in 




Child care subsidy in both Spring 1997 
&  1999  0.093
(0.071)





Receives government help paying for child 
care  -0.051
(0.038)
Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 
1997, not Spring 1999 (no Gov't child 





Gov't child care subsidy in both Spring 




Age 0.031 0.038 0.032
  .010)*
0.038 0.032 0.038 0.031
.010)*
0.038
(0.010)*** (0.015)**  (0.015)** (0.010)*** (0.015)** (0.015)**
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000)**
-0.012
  (0.000)** (0.000)***
 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)**
-0.013
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)***
  African  American  (white  omitted)
 
0.178 -0.012 0.178 0.177 -0.011 0.178
(0.019) (0.033)*** (0.019) (0.033)*** (0.018) (0.033)*** (0.019) (0.033)***
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Table B7-B. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies, cont. 
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 


















Hispanic          0.105  -0.015 0.105 -0.015 0.105 -0.015 0.105 -0.015
  (0.025)  (0.037)***       (0.037)***     
       
)               
              5   
(   (0.055)        
                 
  (0 **      
  0.495 0.            
gh-school omitted)       
                 
     (0 **  
             
     
            
            
Widowed              
              
Divorced/separated              
      (0.029)***     
  0.294          
            
       (  
                 
    (0 ** 
         
  (0 **   (0 **   
(0.025)
-0.023 
(0.037)*** (0.025) (0.025) (0.037)***














-0.051 0.065 0.067 -0.051 -0.051
(0.055)   (0.038)* (0.055)   (0.038)*   (0.055) (0.038)*
-0.147 Non-citizen -0.146 -0.205
.042)*










0.495 0.495 0.145 0.495
(0.030)***  (0.037)***  (0.030)*** (0.037)*** (0.030)*** (0.037)*** (0.031)*** (0.037)***





  (0.035)*** (0.037)***  (0.037)***
0.785
(0.035)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)***
0.784  College  degree  or  more
 
0.785 0.514 0.514 0.785 0.514
(0.043)***  (0.043)*** (0.040)***  (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.040)***
Never married (Married/cohabitating 
omitted) 
 
0.161 0.161 0.162 0.160
(0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.041)***





(0.029)***   (0.028)*** (0.028)***







Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17 
 
    -0.061    -0.060 
0.031)*
  -0.061 
(0.031)* (0.031)*    (0.031)**
Middle Atlantic (Northeast omitted)
 
-0.103 -0.219 -0.104 -0.219 -0.102 -0.219 -0.105 -0.219
.051)* (0.036)***  (0.036)*** (0.051)***  (0.051)*** (0.036)*** (0.051)*** (0.035)***
E. North Central  -0.180  -0.151 
.049)*
-0.181  -0.151 -0.180 -0.151
.049)*
-0.183 -0.151
(0.033)***  (0.033)***   (0.049)*** (0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.049)***
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Table B7-B. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies, cont. 

















W.  North  Central    0.022    -0.219 -0.219    0.022 -0.218 0.022 -0.221 0.022 
(0.037)***  (0.037)*** (0.054)  (0.054) (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.054)
South Atlantic  -0.189  -0.097  -0.189  -0.097 -0.188 -0.097 -0.191 -0.097
(0.033)***  (0.033)*** (0.049)**  (0.049)** (0.033)*** (0.049)** (0.033)*** (0.049)**
-0.181 E. South Central  -0.286  -0.181  -0.287  -0.181 -0.285 -0.181 -0.289
(0.036)***  (0.036)*** (0.058)***
-0.223 





W. South Central  -0.219  -0.220  -0.223 -0.222 -0.223
(0.035)***  (0.035)***   (0.053)*** (0.035)*** (0.053)*** (0.035)*** (0.053)***
Mountain -0.181 -0.146 -0.182 -0.146 -0.181 -0.146 -0.182 -0.146
(0.038)***  (0.038)*** (0.058)**  (0.058)** (0.038)*** (0.058)** (0.038)***
-0.066
(0.058)**
Pacific -0.065 -0.253 -0.065 -0.252 -0.065 -0.253 -0.253




  (0.035)*   (0.051)***
  
(0.035)* (0.051)***
  Union  member
 
0.182 0.181 0.182 0.181
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)***
Part-time
 
-0.086 -0.085 -0.085 -0.086
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
23 dummies for two-digit industries and 14 dummies for two-digit occupations excluded from output, but included in regressions 
         
1.514 -0.789 1.510 -0.789 1.500 -0.792 51 -0.787
(0.236)***  (0.236)*** (0.285)***  (0.285)*** (0.236)*** (0.285)*** (0.236)*** (0.285)***
Observations 29072 0 29072 29072 29072 29072 29072 29072
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*significant at 10% **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
    (0.054)   
         
       
         
      (0.058)*** 
   -      
  (0.053)***      
                 
       
                 
         
     
         
                 
         
            
   
Constant             1. 4   
       
            
    29 72             
 
Table B7-C. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies 
Dependent variable is log of wages, in December 1999 constant dollars 
  Springs 1997 & 1999  Spring 2002 




















  Any child care assistance  -0.036 -0.090
  (0.022)           (0.028)***
Child care subsidy in Spring 1997, not
Spring 1999 (no child care subsidy in 
either wave omitted) 
 
          
          
          
          
Child care subsidy in both Spring 
1997 & 1999 
 
Child care subsidy in Spring 1999, not
1 9 9 7  
 
          
          
             
     (0 **      (0 **  
            
   
          
          
          
         -0.015     
 (0 **      
         
  (0 **        (  





Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 
1997, not Spring 1999 (no Gov't child 
care  subsidy  in  either  wave  omitted)
         
Gov't child care subsidy in both 
Spring  1997  &  1999 
 
Gov't child care subsidy in Spring 
1999, not 1997 
  Age 0.032
.008)*
0.030 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.028 -0.014
(0.012)**  (0.012)** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.016) (0.011)** (0.016)
Age squared  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001
  .000)*
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)*
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Table B7-C. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies, cont. 




















African  American  (white  omitted)  -0.015 -0.043  -0.016 0.179   0.179  -0.046 0.234  0.235 
  (0.014) (0.027)***   (0.027)***  (0.020)**   ( ** 
       0.129      0.143 
 (0 **             
Other  race           
   (0 **      )  (0 **  )   
             0.058   
(0 * (  (0 ** (0.036)   
Non-citizen  -0.131     -0.285 -     -0.065   
  (0 **  (0 ** (0.036)***  ( **  (0.032)**  
High-school                   
**  **  **  
         0.601 0.246 
 (0 ** (0 ** (0 **    
     0.494      6 
0 **    
Never married (Married/cohabitating 
omitted)      0.064       0.124 
   (             
               
 (0 )      (0 )    
Divorced/separated       3       0 
   (0 **      (0 **    
             
             
    (0 **    (0.032)**     
  -0.066               





























(0.027) (0.027) (0.044)*** (0.050)**

























(less than high-school omitted) 
Some  college 



































Children 6 to 17 only (children 0 to 5 only 
omitted) 
 




-0.070  Children 0 to 5 and 6 to 17 
 
  -0.102    -0.102 
.023)*
   
(0.023)*** (0.032)**







.043)* (0.028)** (0.044)*** (0.028)** (0.043)***
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Table B7-C. Wage Regressions, with Child Care Subsidies, cont. 









  Springs 1997 & 1999  Spring 2002 
Wage 









E. North Central  -0.141  -0.124  -0.141        -0.124 -0.183  0.043 -0.179 0.043 
  (0 ** (0 **      
                 
  (0 ** (0 **   
           
  (0 **      
           
  (0 **     
       
       
               
  (0 ** ( *     
       -0.250       
               
        
         
Part-time             
         
            
   
                 
       
            
                 
          
            
%; *** significant at 1%
(0.027)*** .042)*   (0.042)*** .027)* (0.043)*** (0.056) (0.043)*** (0.056)







(0.047)  (0.047) (0.044)***
-0.228
(0.044)*** (0.060)***
South Atlantic  -0.103  -0.153
.027)*
-0.103 0.028 -0.228 0.028
(0.027)*** (0.042)**
-0.136 
  (0.042)** (0.042)***
-0.334
(0.055) (0.042)*** (0.055)





(0.030)*** (0.049)*** (0.065) (0.049)***
 
(0.065)
W. South Central  -0.183  -0.183  -0.192 -0.275 -0.045 -0.272 -0.045
(0.059) (0.029)*** (0.045)***
-0.105
  (0.045)*** (0.029)*** (0.045)*** (0.059)
-0.004
(0.045)***















(0.043)* (0.057) (0.043) (0.057)




  -0.094 -0.070 -0.070
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
23 dummies for two-digit industries and 14 dummies for two-digit occupations excluded from output, but included in regressions 
    
 
    
Constant 1.530 -0.634 1.529 -0.633 1.832 -0.007 1.854 -0.008
(0.160)*** (0.228)***  (0.228)*** (0.160)*** (0.251)*** (0.296) (0.251)*** (0.296)
Observations
 
64173 64173 64173 64173 27186 27186 27186 27186
Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses
*significant at 10% **significant at 5  
 